Institutional Traps and Private Housing Sector Adaptation: A Case Study of the Bangkok Metropolitan Region by Whitbread, Karmen
 
 
 
 
Institutional Traps and Private Housing Sector Adaptation:  
A Case Study of the Bangkok Metropolitan Region 
 
by 
 
Karmen Whitbread 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis 
presented to the University of Waterloo 
in fulfillment of the 
thesis requirement for the degree of 
Master of Environmental Studies 
in 
Planning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2017 
©Karmen Whitbread 2017 
 
  
iii 
 
Author’s Declaration 
 
This thesis consists of material all of which I authored or co-authored: see Statement of 
Contributions included in the thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final 
revisions, as accepted by my examiners. 
I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public. 
  
iv 
 
Statement of Contribution 
 
This thesis is written in a manuscript format.  Two chapters are written as independent 
manuscripts with the intent of publishing them in academic journals.  While I am the principle author of 
all chapters in this thesis, Dr. Carrie Mitchell made contributions to both manuscripts, which comprise 
of Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
The first manuscript, Public Sector Incapacities Lead to Private Sector Adaptation in Thailand, 
is co-authored with Dr. Carrie Mitchell.  Mitchell contributed 10% in idea feedback and structure 
improvements.   
The second manuscript, A Flood of Change in Bangkok’s Housing Sector: A Case Study on 
Private Sector Adaptation, is also co-authored with Dr. Carrie Mitchell.  Mitchell contributed 15% in 
idea feedback, research question feedback, structure improvement, and editing throughout. The 
manuscript is ready for submission to Cities. 
  
v 
 
Abstract 
Southeast Asia is at particular risk of the impacts of climate change which is, and is predicted to 
continue, causing increased intensity and frequency of extreme weather events.  Thailand is particularly 
vulnerable to these events, as well droughts.  In 2011, Thailand experience the worst flood in 50 years, 
while four years later the county experienced the worst drought in 50 years, as well as continued 
flooding, particularly in parts of the Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR).  Flood management, 
therefore, is a key aspect of Thai planning.   Lebel et al. (2011), however, identified five institutional 
traps that hinder effective flood management—fragmentation, rigidity, elite capture, scale, and crisis 
management.  These traps continue to hamper flood management strategies.  Unfortunately, little is 
known about how these institutional traps impact water governance and non-government stakeholders.  
I interviewed public officials (n=23) and analyzed six newspapers, totalling 924 articles, on flood and 
drought management and the private housing sector in Thailand, and the BMR in particular.  Results 
demonstrate that institutional traps continue to hinder effective flood and drought management in 
Thailand and have led to water mismanagement as well as a lack of trust in the government’s ability to 
effectively manage water resources.  In turn, this has led to an increase in non-government actors 
engaging in flood and drought management, specifically the military, royalty, and the private sector.  
While the involvement of the military and royalty in flood and drought management are viewed 
positively by the media, the private sector received mixed reviews by the media and respondents.  At 
times the private sector is praised for stepping in to provide flood and drought management techniques, 
but they are also recognised for acting disreputably. 
Due to the mixed evaluation of the private sector’s actions to address flood management issues, 
an in-depth review of the private housing sector’s actions to reduce the risk of flooding within the 
Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR) was undertaken.  The BMR is especially vulnerable to intense 
rainfall due to its proximity to the coast and rapid urbanization.  Drawing on the interviews with public 
officials (n=23), I review the current practices used by Bangkok’s private housing sector to adapt to the 
increased risk of floods in the city. Current adaptation strategies are primarily protective in nature, 
including: elevating land and constructing walls.  These strategies can effectively reduce the risk of 
flooding to private property and adjacent properties, and may lead to co-benefits for networked urban 
infrastructures, such a stormwater management.  Yet if these strategies are implemented poorly, they 
could be considered maladaptive by increasing the risk of flooding to surrounding properties and 
communities, and creating conflict between those who have adapted and those that have not. Overall, 
the results suggest that the private housing sector in the BMR is adapting to flooding. However, with 
limited government regulations, programs, or incentives, the adaptation process in the BMR is largely 
uncoordinated and unplanned.  
The results of this study demonstrate that poor flood management by the public sector can 
broaden water governance to other non-public stakeholders, with varying degrees of acceptance.  
Results indicate that the private housing sector, specifically, can be an effective mechanism to reduce 
the risk of urban flooding, but only if strong planning initiatives are implemented to manage their 
actions.  Ultimately, this thesis contributes to the literature by outlining how institutional traps that 
hamper the public sector’s ability to effectively manage water resources can encourage a broadening of 
water governance; however, broader stakeholder involvement ought to be managed to ensure it is in the 
best interest of all.  
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Section 1: Thesis Introduction 
 
1.1  Flood and Drought Management, Public and Private Involvement 
 Three-quarters of the world population live in areas affected by natural hazards (United Nations 
Development Programme [UNDP], 2004).  The scope and impacts of weather-related hazards are 
expected to increase due to climate change, particularly through shifts in timing, frequency, and 
intensity of precipitation (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2014).  As a result, 
humans must adapt to a changing climate in order cope with, and reduce, the risk to lives and property 
(World Economic Forum, 2016). 
 The Asian region is among the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change (Maplecroft, 
2013).  The Climate Change Vulnerability Index places nine of the top ten most vulnerable countries in 
South and Southeast Asia (Maplecroft, 2013).  The region is characterized by monsoons and tropical 
cyclones that can bring intense rainfall and storm surges to a largely coastal area.  Economically, most 
of the countries are less economically developed and rely on climate-sensitive sectors, such as 
agriculture (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], 2007).  Less 
developed countries also lack financial resources to facilitate adaptation to climate change (UNFCCC, 
2007). 
 Nevertheless, these countries are striving to mitigate climate change.  As part of the Conference 
of the Parties in Paris, 2015, every member country from Southeast Asia submitted an intended 
nationally determined contribution (INDC) to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Climate Brief, 2015).  
Collectively they pledged to reduce 5.15% of the global share of emission in 2012.
2
  Thailand, for 
example, pledged to reduce emissions by 20% by 2030, which could increase to 25% with international 
support (Climate Brief, 2015).  Thailand’s share of global emission reduction is 0.84%, and is 
comparable to other middle-income countries around the world, including South Africa (0.86%) and 
Turkey (0.85%).   
Countries are also adapting the impacts of climate change.  The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) defines adaptation as the “adjustment in natural or human systems in response 
to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial 
opportunities” (IPCC, 2007, p. 750).  If cities and countries fail to adapt, an estimated 100 million more 
people will experience annual flooding (IPCC, 2007)—a 50% increase from the current 200 million at 
risk (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2004).  Furthermore, the option of inaction 
will become increasingly costly, as larger disasters cause greater losses and damages and adaptive 
                                                             
2 Excluding international aviation and shipping. 
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options become more extensive (World Bank, 2010b; IPCC, 2007).  Adapting to the natural 
environment is not a new concept though; societies have been adjusting to the environment for as long 
as it has posed a threat, obstacle, or opportunity to humans (White, G.F., 1936, 1945; White, L., 2012); 
however, the rate of adaptation required to adjust to current and expected climate changes is 
unprecedented. 
 Cities are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change due to their built form and 
population density. Moreover, many cities are situated along rivers or coastlines, which are especially 
susceptible to flooding (Revi et al., 2014).  In 2008, the global population became 50% urban, with 
most of the largest cities located in low- or middle-income countries (World Bank, 2008; Satterthwaite 
et al., 2010).  While urbanization is linked to economic prosperity (World Bank, 2008; Satterthwaite et 
al., 2010), the IPCC highlights that rapid urbanization has made many local governments unable to 
manage their cities (Revi et al., 2014; see also Roy, 2009).   A report by United Cities and Local 
Governments (2011) noted that adaptation in Asian municipalities are financially hindered,  since a 
high proportion of a municipal budget is already used to maintain the urban system, leaving few funds 
for adaptive action.   
 While governments at various levels struggle to adapt to climate change, it is widely accepted 
that other actors should be, and are, engaged in climate change adaptation, including the private sector 
(Revi et al., 2014; Leck and Simon, 2013; World Bank, 2010a, 2010b; Satterthwaite et al., 2007; 
UNISDR, 2007).   
Private sector adaptation to disasters and climate change is a relatively new concept.  
Traditionally, adaptation has been a top-down enterprise where higher levels of government “provide 
the legislative, financial, and institutional basis within which urban authorities, the private sector, civil 
society, and other stakeholders act to adapt to climate change” (Dodman et al., 2009, p. 161).  However, 
non-state actors have the capacity to not only boost financial resources to address public budgetary 
shortfalls, but can also offer expertise in adaptation implementation and, in the case of land owners, 
have a vested interest in reducing the impacts of climate change. 
 In major urban centers, particularly those situated along coastlines, in-situ adaptation is often 
necessary due to the insurmountable cost of moving an entire city.  Furthermore, the vast majority of 
urban land is owned by the private sector in some countries, and therefore are key stakeholders in 
climate change adaptation.  According to the IPCC, “the private sector plays a small, but increasingly 
important role in disaster risk management and adaptation” (2012, p. 347).  Similarly, the United 
Nations Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR, 2007) suggests that national 
agendas for disaster reduction should be built upon existing systems and incorporate various levels of 
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government and ministries, scientific and academic institutes, civil societies, NGOs, opinion shapers 
(eg. media), and the private sector.   
 
1.2  Research Objectives 
The capacity for the private sector to adapt is independent of the public sector’s ability to adapt 
(Revi et al., 2014).  Therefore, while the public sector, particularly in low- and middle-income 
countries, may lack the resources and capacity to adapt, the private sector is not necessarily afflicted by 
the same challenges.  Nevertheless the public and private sectors are connected.  Cities are brittle 
systems, where disturbance or failure in one infrastructural system can cause a ripple effect across other 
systems (Graham, 2009). For example, an electrical power outage will impact transportation systems as 
traffic signals and electric public transit systems are interrupted, which reduces the private sector’s 
ability to serve their clients.  Urban residents and businesses are often reliant on municipalities for 
essential infrastructure; however, if these essential infrastructures fail, a cascading disaster situation can 
develop.  
Natural disasters are often the catalyst for infrastructural failures.  For example, floods can 
wash out transportation infrastructure (Passifiume, 2013); heat waves can crash power networks by 
increasing demand for electricity (Nelson & Anan, 2016; NY1 News, 2016); high wind from tropical 
storms can topple trees onto electrical poles, which spark fires during a time of high demand for 
emergency services and impeded mobility (O’Rourke, 2016); and droughts can lower the water table, 
reducing the ability to provide tap water (Tang, 2015).  In Thailand, for example, a flood crippled the 
country in 2011, while four years later a drought caused roads and buildings to subside and put over 10 
million people in the Bangkok Metropolitan Region at risk of running out of tap water.   
On the other hand, private sector development relies on, and affects the public realm.  As a 
result, planning departments at various governmental levels regulate development to ensure it is in the 
best interest of the public, without unnecessarily constraining private interests.  While the private sector 
relies on public infrastructures to conduct business and protect them from natural disasters, they can 
also act irrespective of public action to adapt to the risk of natural hazards.  However, knowledge of the 
political and economic environment that promotes private sector adaption, particularly in the housing 
sector, and their adaptation strategies are limited.  This thesis explores these two key limitations in the 
literature.   A case study was conducted in the Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR) of Thailand in 
2015 to investigate inefficiencies in the government’s ability to manage water influences the private 
sector, and examine specific strategies the private housing sector employs to adapt to flooding. While 
there are numerous private sector actors, this thesis focuses on private sector developers, particularly 
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within the housing industry, who are subject to formal building processes.  Individual homebuilders that 
may or may not hold the title to the land they build on are, therefore, beyond the scope of this research. 
 
1.3 Bangkok Metropolitan Region, Thailand 
 The Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR) is comprised of six provinces:  Bangkok, 
Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani, Samut Prakan, Samut Sakhon, and Nakhon Pathom (Figure 1).  The BMR 
contains 14.6 million residents (Table 1) (NSO, 2010), and an estimated three to four million informal 
residents (Yap & De Wandeler, 2010; NSO & UNICEF, 2006), The BMR is, therefore, a primate city 
that is 20 times larger Thailand’s second largest urban center (NSO, 2010).   
Since the early 1990s, Thailand has experienced rapid economic growth, primarily in the 
manufacturing and tourism sectors (World Bank, 2012).  As a result, people moved from low 
productivity agricultural areas to manufacturing and service areas (World Bank, 2012).  The majority of 
manufacturing growth has occurred within the Chao Phraya floodplain (Poaponsakorn & Meethom, 
2012; Lebel et al., 2011). Located at the mouth of the Chao Phraya River, which drains a third of 
Thailand, the BMR is particularly vulnerable to riverine and coastal flooding.  With an elevation 
between 1-2 metres above sea-level, the region is also susceptible to surface floods.  
Figure 1: Bangkok Metropolitan Region 
  
 
Table 1: Population of the Bangkok Metropolitan Region, 2010 census data (NSO, 2010). 
Province Population (million) Proportion of the BMR 
Bangkok 8.305 56.8% 
Nonthaburi 1.334 9.1% 
Pathum Thani 1.327 9.1% 
Samut Prakan 1.829 12.5% 
Samut Sakhon 0.887 6.1% 
Nakhon Pathom 0.944 6.5% 
Total 14.626 100.0% 
Thailand 
Myanmar Laos 
Cambodia 
Vietnam 
Malaysia 
Gulf of 
Thailand 
Andaman 
Sea 
Bangkok 
Metropolitan 
Region 
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1.4 Manuscript 1: Public Sector Incapacities Lead to Private Sector Adaptation in 
Thailand 
 This thesis is composed of two independent, but connected, manuscripts.  The first investigates 
flood and drought management in Thailand.  Informed by Lebel et al.’s (2011) institutional traps that 
hinder effective flood management, Manuscript 1 broadens the scope to flood management as a whole, 
and therefore includes not only floods (eg. the 2011 national flood and localized flooding in Bangkok), 
but droughts as well (eg. the 2015 national drought).  Through interviews with public officials (n=23) 
and an analysis of articles in six local and national newspapers (n= 926), I find that Thailand remains 
affected by institutional traps, which has opened a window for other actors to participate in flood or 
drought management, specifically the private sector.  However, public officials and the media 
emphasize that private sector involvement has been ad hoc, and has not necessarily benefited Thailand 
as a whole. 
 
1.5 Manuscript 2: A Flood of Change in Bangkok’s Housing Sector: A Case Study on 
Private Sector Adaptation 
 The second manuscript delves deeper into private sector flood management actions, specifically 
how the private housing sector is adapting to reduce flood risk.  A case study of the Bangkok 
Metropolitan Region (BMR), a megacity of approximately 10.8 million people (NSO, 2010), is 
presented as a case study.  With an average elevation between 1m to 2m above sea level, this lowland 
megacity is highly susceptible to floods.  The flood risk is three-fold.  First, floods in 2006 and 2011 
illustrate the risk of overland upstream floods; secondly the low elevation makes the city prone to storm 
surges and sea level rise; and finally, rapid urbanization, the loss of greenspace and canals due to 
development, and an ineffective stormwater system frequently lead to surface flooding from intense 
localized precipitation events.  The repeated flooding of Bangkok provides an opportunity to investigate 
private sector actions to protect residents and their property from floodwaters.  Interviews with public 
officials (n=23) between June and July, 2015 inform the paper with the official stance on private 
housing sector adaptation, and its perceived impacts on flood management within the BMR.  Public 
officials across the BMR acknowledge that the private housing sector is adapting to flood risk; 
however, public sector officials also contend that these actions are maladaptive to the city and adjacent 
residents. 
 
1.6 Organization of Thesis 
 This thesis uses the manuscript option, where research is presented in two complete 
manuscripts that are ready to be submitted to academic journals.  Each manuscript is intended to stand 
alone; however, collectively they explore the role of the private housing sector in adapting to climate 
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change and flooding in particular. Chapter 2 is composed of the first manuscript. In Chapter 3, I connect 
the first and second manuscripts.  The second manuscript comprises Chapter 4 of this thesis.  Finally, I 
summarize the key findings from both manuscript and propose avenues for future research in Chapter 5. 
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Section 2: Methodology 
 
2.1 Mixed Methods Approach 
The aim of this research is to explore the role of private adaptation, and its ability to reduce the 
risk of flooding in the housing sector, which was achieved through a mixed methods approach.  A 
mixed method research design incorporates multiple avenues of investigation into a single study 
(Creswell, 2014).  A mixed methods approach typically combines the strengths of qualitative and 
quantitative methods, in an attempt to “obtain an authentic representation of the problem through the 
eyes of participants” (Creswell, 2014, p. 107).  This research uses qualitative methods in the form of 
interviews and quantitative methods to analyze interviews as well as local newspapers.   
Interview participants were purposefully selected (Creswell, 2014) based on (1) employment in 
a department or agency involved in flood management and/or housing, (2) responsibility in at least one 
of the four provinces, and (3) position of leadership within their organization.  Through local academic 
experts, review of government websites, and using the snowball technique (Charmaz, 2006), we 
identified 23 agencies and organizations that fit these criteria.  Nine of these agencies participated in 
this study, resulting in 23 interviews, which were conducted between May – August, 2015.  The 
location of responsibility for all respondents is evenly distributed: with two to four respondents having 
provincial responsibility from each province and 12 respondents with responsibilities across the BMR, 
or the Central Region of Thailand. Eighteen 30-60 minute interviews were conducted face-to-face; five 
email interviews were also conducted.  At the discretion of the respondents, interviews were conducted 
in English or Thai with the aid of an interpreter.
3
  Interview scripts were initially prepared in Canada 
with questions based on literature.  The script was then pre-tested in Bangkok with local researchers 
and minor adjustments were made to better accommodate Thai culture.  The script remained unchanged 
throughout the fieldwork; however, some current events that emerged through the newspaper review 
were used to prompt or provide additional context to some questions. 
Interviews were conducted in all provinces within the Bangkok Metropolitan Region where the 
Chao Phraya River transverse its territory, namely: Bangkok, Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani, and Samut 
Prakan.
4
  These four provinces house 88% of the region’s population (NSO, 2010).  After interviews 
were conducted, data was anonymized, and transcribed, and analyzed with NVivo. Pre-determined 
codes, based on literature, were developed for potential private housing sector adaptation strategies as 
                                                             
3 Appendix 5 contains confidentiality statements for research assistants with access to confidential material. 
4 Interviews were conducted with officials from the following agencies: the centralized government departments of the Department of 
Public Works Town and Country Planning (DTP) and the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM);  the provincial 
departments of the Provincial Administration Organization (PAO), City Planning Department (CPD), Department of Environment (DoE), and 
Bangkok Fire and Rescue Department (BFRD); the municipal department of city planning; and the national housing organizations of the 
National Housing Authority (NHA) and Community Organization Development Institution (CODI). 
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well as some flood management codes; while other flood management codes emerged during the 
analysis process.  Transcriptions were coded by myself to minimize variation in applying codes.  Codes 
where then analyzed to determined common themes across interviews. 
To supplement qualitative based interviews, a media review was conducted to provide 
quantitative, as well as additional qualitative, data.  Media is widely recognised as influencing public 
and policymaker opinion (Ahchong & Dodds, 2012; Wanta, Golan, & Lee, 2004; Cook et al., 1983; 
McCombs & Shaw, 1972), and provides information on current events.  Newspapers were selected for 
two reasons: (1) Thailand has a high literacy rate of 93.5% (UNICEF, 2013), which allows for a wide 
readership, and (2) the Office of Non-Formal and Informal Education (ONIE) also has almost 30,000 
newspaper reading centres to increase adult learning (ONIE, nd.).  For these reasons, newspapers have 
the widest reaching audience in Thailand.  Specific newspapers were purposefully selected to provide a 
representation of views based on (1) a city versus national focus, (2) English versus Thai language, (3) 
various audiences, and (4) widespread readership.  Six newspapers were selected for review, including 
two English language newspapers which were reviewed from May 21 to August 7, 2015, and four Thai 
newspapers which were reviewed from June 7 to August 7, 2015.
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Articles were collected on natural disasters (n=723) and climate change (n=56), as well as 
housing specifically located within the BMR (n= 125), and other relevant topics (n=20).   English 
newspapers were reviewed and coded for latent and manifest content, while Thai newspapers were 
reviewed and coded for manifest content by a Thai assistant.  Latent content is tangible content (such as 
if an agency was mentioned or not) and manifest content is an underlying meaning (such as if an 
agency’s action was portrayed positively or not).   Newspaper codes were predetermined and based on 
climate change and natural disaster literature (see Houston et al., 2012; Fu et al., 2012; Ahchong & 
Dodds, 2012; Lebel et al., 2011).  The initial coding was completed by two individuals, each 
responsible for either English or Thai newspapers.  The more intensive English newspaper review was 
further checked by four research assistants to ensure a consistent application of codes.  Data was coded 
and analyzed in Microsoft Excel to determine frequency and significant differences through chi-square 
tests.  However, chi-square test resulted in minimal beneficial results.  It is also important to note that 
media carries an inherent bias, since its primary objective is to report current events for the purpose of 
selling papers; therefore, results from the media analysis must be critically reviewed. 
 
2.2 Public versus Private Sector Respondents 
 This research sought to understand the public sector’s views and opinions on the state of public 
flood management, and the actions of the private housing sector, with respect to flooding and climate 
                                                             
5 Newspapers reviewed included: Bangkok Post (English, Bangkok focus), The Nation (English, national focus), Post Today (Thai, Bangkok 
focus), Kom Chand Luek (Thai, national focus), Thai Rath (Thai, national focus), and Matichon (Thai, national focus). 
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change.  Public officials, due to their various positions within the government, are able to provide an 
insider’s perceptive on public sector flood management.  Many respondents have direct involvement in 
managing water, either at the local or national level, and are able to provide insight on the institutional 
traps that hinder effective management of water resources.   
Many respondents are also responsible to regulate private sector actions.  Therefore, these 
public officials are able to provide an official view of private sector adaptation.  Their intimate 
knowledge about how the public sector effectively, or ineffectively, manages private sector 
development provides insight on the strengths and weaknesses of current regulatory systems.  
Therefore, public sector officials provide a unique perspective on flood management, and the private 
housing sector’s involvement in flood risk reduction. 
 
2.3 Reliability and Validity 
Creditable studies are required to be reliable and valid.   The concept of reliability differs 
between qualitative research (eg. interviews) and quantitative research (eg. media review).  In 
qualitative research reliability is provided through consistent interviews and data analysis.  Interviews 
are a fundamental qualitative research tool that is used broadly, as well as specifically in Thailand in 
regards to flood management (Berquist et al., 2015; Lebel et al., 2011).  Each interview followed the 
same set of open-ended questions (Appendix 3) and was audio recorded.  For interviews in Thai, 
transcriptions were based on the original spoke Thai, which allowed for a more reliable translation.  
Finally, interview data was coded by one individual to provide consistency among transcripts. 
Qualitative validity includes the trustworthiness, authenticity, and credibility of the researcher, 
research methods, and interviewees (Creswell, 2014).  I interviewed people in positions of authority 
who were knowledgeable about the situation of their respective organizations. Furthermore, 
triangulation was used to validate their comments.  Triangulation is where information is compared 
against other information that has been deemed valid, which for this research includes government 
documents and newspaper reporting, as well as other interviewees’ responses both within and between 
organizations.  Finally, full quotations were used wherever possible in order to capture the original 
intent of the interviewee.  Utilizing interviewees’ direct words also reduces issues of personal bias.   
For quantitative research validity refers the aspect under study can accurately answer what the 
research wants to know (Creswell, 2014).  The newspaper code sheet used in this study was developed 
through pre-determined codes, following Houston, Pfefferbaun, & Rosenholtz (2012), Fu et al. (2012), 
and Ahchong & Dodds (2012) models, and modified to accommodate articles relating to housing.   
For quantitative research, reliability refers to measurement consistency (Creswell, 2014).  For 
this research, it means that each newspaper coder would code the same news article the same way.  To 
10 
 
ensure a consistent understanding and application of codes between the English and Thai newspaper 
reviewers, codes where discussed in detail between myself and a Thai research assistant who reviewed 
newspapers in Thai.  The in-depth English newspaper review was further verified through the use of 
four research assistants to check the codes.  Each code assistant made minor adjustments and initial 
changes where checked by the individual who originally coded the news articles to ensure 
appropriateness of the change.  The process resulted in an inter-coder percent agreement of 97.2% for 
manifest content and 96.6% for latent content, both within Landis & Koch (1977) standard for 
agreement and is therefore considered reliable. 
 
2.4 Limitation and Bias 
It is important to note that qualitative and quantitative research have several limitations (Punch, 
1998).  Qualitative research, and interviews in particular, can be biased by the respondents as well as 
the researcher (Creswell, 2014).  The respondent’s personal opinions may influence their responses and 
therefore may not accurately reflect the situation.  Furthermore, the researcher’s positionality may 
influence how participants respond to questions as well as the research interpretation of those responses 
(Sultana, 2007).  The fact that I am a Caucasian from Canada with the support of a university may have 
influence my access to officials I contacted for an interview and the information they were willing to 
share.  Based on conversations with local researchers, my position likely increased access to 
government officials but was unlikely to influence the information they provided.  
While this may be heightened in cross-cultural studies, every effort was made to place the 
respondent at ease, including conducting interviews in a location and language of their choosing. 
Quantitative research bias in generally classified into two types: systematic and random.  
Systematic bias is when each point is inaccurate.  For example, in a media review systematic bias can 
result from which newspapers were selected for review and reviewers with a different understanding of 
codes.  This type of bias was reduced by selecting a range of newspapers and through discussions about 
codes with my research assistants.  However, this research is biased towards English newspapers which 
were reviewed in more detail.  Random bias is error that is accidental, such as marking the wrong code.  
This was reduced by only analyzing manifest content in Thai newspapers and employing code checkers 
for the more in-depth analysis of English newspapers. 
An important bias in this research is that respondents were sought from the public sector to 
understand their level of awareness of private sector adaptations.  The thoughts and opinions of private 
sector stakeholders are not represented here and, therefore, I make no claim that the strategies or 
motivations discussed are exhaustive or represent private stakeholders’ opinion, but are restricted to 
those that public sector respondents are knowledgeable of. 
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Section 3: Institutional Traps Lead to Private Sector Flood and Drought 
Adaptation in Thailand 
 
3.1 Introduction  
In 2011, Thailand experienced the worst flood in decades, with impacts felt around the world as 
supply chains, particularly automotive and rice production, were disrupted by floodwaters (Aon 
Bonfield, 2012; Philips, 2011).  In the aftermath of the 2011 flood, the public outcry for a revision of 
flood management strategies prompted the Thai government to allocate USD $3.85 billion in assistance, 
restoration, and compensation as well as the creation of a Flood Management Master Plan 
(Poaponsakom & Meethom, 2012). 
 Four years later, Bangkok remains vulnerable to floods.  In 2015, Bangkok experienced 
repeated surface floods due to heavy localized precipitation.  The first event on March 25 stimulated the 
governor of the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA), Sukhumbhand Paribatra, to explain the 
situation, saying, “the downpour was unusually strong, falling at up to 60-70mm/hour” and “the city 
was holding water in the adjacent Saen Saep canal to cope with the dry season” (Fernquest, 2015).  
While the precipitation event was approximately 10% of Bangkok’s annual rainfall, the governor 
concluded by stating, “Hard-hit areas—such as a basement-level supermarket…are private property and 
not the BMA’s responsibility” (Fernquest, 2015) and people should “move to the mountains if [they] 
don’t want to get flooded” (Coconut Bangkok, 2015).   
Three months later, Bangkok experienced repeated heavy rains in the middle of June that 
resulted in localized floods and caused public outcry as “frustrated communities and motorists sat there 
wondering what on earth the BMA had done to prepare for downpours” (Saridet, 2015). Angry at the 
Governor ’s inability to fulfill his 2010 election campaign vow to fix the capital’s flood problem in just 
five years (Saridet, 2015; Sasithorn, 2015a), many beseeched the Prime Minister to replace the 
Governor with “someone more competent in flood prevention” (Tanatpong, 2015).   
 While streets in Bangkok flowed with water during the summer of 2015, rivers and canals were 
running dry in northern Thailand as the El Nino strengthened, bringing drought conditions to the region.  
As a result, a government spokesman stated, “It is expected that the drought this year may be worse 
than last year so we ask all parties not to be complacent and for our farmer brothers to delay planting 
their crops” (Lefevre, 2015).  However, some criticised the government for the mismanagement of 
water resources, which they claim is the actual cause of the drought (Atiya, 2015; Witatayotin, 2015).  
 While Thailand has repeatedly faced water-related disasters, from the 2011 flood to recent 
surface floods in Bangkok and widespread drought in 2015, the government continues to struggle with 
effective flood and drought management.  In defining effective flood and drought management, we take 
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a utilitarian approach where the impacts of floods and droughts are minimized for the most number of 
people.  Lebel et al. (2011) proposed five institutional traps that hinder Thailand’s ability to effectively 
management floods.  This paper builds on their argument by providing recent examples from the 2011 
and 2015 floods, as well as expanding the argument by applying institutional traps to droughts.  We 
argue that while some progress has been achieved, Lebel et al.’s (2011) institutional traps remain major 
obstacles for flood and drought management in Thailand.  As a result, other stakeholders, including the 
military, royalty, and the private sector, are becoming active in Thailand’s flood and drought 
management.  While a multi-stakeholder approach is widely considered as a beneficial characteristic in 
environmental management, the incapacity of public departments to effectively manage water resources 
has created an arena that fosters private sector adaptation, which has mixed outcomes for Thailand. 
 
3.2  History of Flood and Drought Management 
 Water related disasters are not new in Thailand.  Seasonal monsoon rains produce annual floods 
throughout the country.  These seasonal floods are vital for rice production, Thailand’s largest export 
good and a significant contributor to the national gross domestic product.  The rapid rate of 
urbanization and industrialization (Poaponsakorn & Meethom, 2012; Lebel et al., 2011) has increased 
the risk of floods in Bangkok, where canals and permeable areas are built over (Marome, 2012; 
Poaponsakorn & Meethom, 2012; Kenworthy, 1995). 
 At the same time, the risk of drought has increased.  In rural areas, the standardizing of rice 
varieties has reduced farmers’ ability to select more drought-resistant varieties (Lebel et al, 2011).  The 
increase in industrial development in flood prone areas has also elevated the risk of floods; as well as 
droughts by increasing the demand for water.  Finally hydro-electric dams, which can mitigate both 
flood and drought conditions, can increase the risk of floods and droughts if mismanaged 
(Poaponsakorn & Meethom, 2012).  While floods and droughts are often considered independently, 
frequently both will occur within a short timeframe or co-currently in Thailand. 
 While Thailand experienced floods and droughts in the past, the level of risk is expected to 
increase with climate change.  The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) projects a shift 
in precipitation towards less frequent but more intense storms, sea level rise, and an increase in the 
number of hot days (IPCC, 2014), particularly in Southeast Asia, and Thailand in particular (Hijioka et 
al., 2014; Kreft, and Eckstein, 2014; Maplecroft, 2012).  Thailand has already experienced an increase 
in temperature, sea level, and intense precipitation events—a shift that is expected to continue (Marks, 
2011). 
Traditionally, climate change and flood adaptation have been a top-down enterprise where 
higher levels of government “provide the legislative, financial, and institutional basis within which 
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urban authorities, the private sector, civil society, and other stakeholders act to adapt to climate change” 
(Dodman et al., 2009, p. 161).  Nevertheless, there is an understanding that successful adaptation 
requires multiple actors, including federal, regional, and municipal governments, non-governmental 
organizations (NGO), citizen groups, and the private sector (Revi et al., 2014; Leck and Simon, 2013; 
World Bank, 2010a, 2010b; Dodman et al., 2009; Satterthwaite et al., 2007).  While various actors are 
recognised to contribute to adaptation, their involvement is highly polarized.  Carmin et al. (2012) 
measured the degree to which each actor is involved in adaptation by surveying 468 cities globally 
about funding to facilitate adaptation, and found that only 40% of cities received any external funding.  
Of those, a quarter received assistance from national governments.  The cities that received national 
funds tend to be large cities that dominate the national economy—cities such as Bangkok, Thailand.  
Only 8% of cities reported receiving support from private foundations or non-government 
organizations. While the private sector only makes up a small portion of the municipal adaptation fund, 
it has vast potential to adapt its own properties (Revi et al., 2014; Castán Broto and Belkeley, 2013; 
IPCC, 2012; O’Brien et al., 2008; Prabhakar et al., 2009).  Nevertheless, flood and drought 
management in Thailand continues to be perceived, almost exclusively, as a public sector 
responsibility—regardless if other actors, such as the private sector and royalty, are actively engaged as 
well. 
 Thailand has numerous agencies tasked with the management of water resources.  Table 2 lists 
the key agencies that are engaged in flood and drought management in Thailand, and the respective 
responsibilities.  Many have overlapping responsibilities.  For example, the Department of Public 
Works and Town and County Planning (DTP) and Provincial Planning Departments (PPDs) are both 
tasked to create land use plans; however, the DTP is a centralized agency while PPDs are provincial. 
The Royal Irrigation Department (RID) and the Electric Generation Authority of Thailand (EGAT) are 
both responsible to manage water level in major dams.   
There are also conflicting or competing interests between various agencies.  For example, the 
RID manages dam water levels to ensure a sufficient water supply to provide irrigation throughout the 
dry season, while EGAT manages water levels to generate hydro-electric power.  The RID is primarily 
responsible for rural flood and drought management and the provision of water for irrigation, while 
Bangkok’s Department of Drainage and Sewerage (DDS) is tasked with urban flood management and 
the efficient conveyance of water out of the city. 
Regardless of how many agencies are tasked with flood and drought management, or how 
capable they are to fulfill their mandate, extreme weather events can overload their ability to cope with 
the overabundance or lack of water. Extreme weather events can represent threshold events where 
current practices fail to protect society, and lead to the re-evaluating, revising, and changing plans and  
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Table 2: Key Flood and Drought Management Agencies in Thailand 
Agency Scope Description of Responsibilities Source 
Office of National 
Water and Flood 
Management 
Policies 
National  To develop flood and drought management policies Maier-Knapp, 
2015 
Ministry of Natural 
Resources and the 
Environment 
National  To develop flood and drought management plans 
 To provide early warning for water-related disasters 
Maier-Knapp, 
2015; Care, 
2013 
National Water 
Resources  and 
Flood Policy 
Committee 
National  To develop flood and drought management policies  Maier-Knapp, 
2015 
Royal Irrigation 
Department (RID) 
National 
(excluding 
Bangkok) 
 To manage rivers and canals and their buffer 
 To manage floodgates and small-scale dams, 
including discharge rates from the nation’s major 
dams 
 To manage the provision of irrigation to agricultural 
areas 
 To manage artificial rainmaking operations 
 To manage nature buffers 
Marks & 
Lebel, 2016; 
Saito, 2014; 
Care, 2013; 
Clark & 
Semmahasak, 
2013 
Department of 
Drainage Systems 
(DDS) 
Bangkok  To manage flooding and drainage infrastructure 
improvements. 
 To maintain the urban stormwater management 
systems, including canals, tunnels, pipes, and 
pumping stations 
 To effectively convey stormwater out of the city 
Saito, 2014 
Department of 
Public Works and 
Town and Country 
Planning (DTP) 
Provincial 
(centralized 
agency) 
 To creates land use plans, in provinces with weaker 
provincial planning departments 
 To advises on and approves land use plans, in 
provinces with stronger provincial planning 
departments 
Saito, 2014; 
Care, 2013 
Provincial Planning 
Department (PPD) 
Provincial  To create land use plans, in provinces with stronger 
PPDs 
 To advise on the creation of, as well as administer, 
land use plans created by the DTP, in provinces with 
weak PPDs 
Saito, 2014 
City Planning 
Department (CPD) 
Municipal/ 
District 
 To create land use plans (Bangkok CPD only) 
 To implement land use plan 
Saito, 2014 
Thai Meteorology 
Department (TMD) 
National  To provides weather forecasts and public weather 
alerts 
 To provide early warning for extreme weather events 
Maier-Knapp, 
2015; Saito, 
2014; Care, 
2013 
Department of 
Disaster Prevention 
and Mitigation 
(DDPM) 
National  To raise awareness about disaster prevention to 
create public readiness, in both the public and private 
spheres 
 To integrate and develop disaster management plans 
that engages various other departments and agencies 
 To manages the flow of information to the public 
 To set standards for emergency search and rescue 
efforts 
 
Maier-Knapp, 
2015; Saito, 
2014; Care, 
2013 
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Agency Scope Description of Responsibilities Source 
National Disaster 
Warning Center 
(NDWC) 
National  To provide early warning on a wide range of natural 
disasters 
Maier-Knapp, 
2015; 
Bangkok Fire and 
Rescue Department 
(BFRD) 
Bangkok  To plan and respond to emergencies Saito, 2014 
Electric Generation 
Authority of 
Thailand (EGAT) 
National 
Dams 
 To manage dam water levels to ensure electric 
generation 
Maier-Knapp, 
2015; 
Municipal 
Waterworks 
Authorities 
(MWA) 
Municipal/ 
District 
 To provide tap water 
 To monitor saltwater intrusion in the Chao Phraya 
River (Bangkok Waterworks Authority) 
 To manage groundwater extraction 
Saito, 2014; 
Care, 2013 
 
policies (Birkmann et al., 2010; Pelling et al., 2008; Schneider et al., 2007; IRP, 2007; Polterovich, 
2007; UNISDR, 2007; UN, 2005; Birkland, 2001).   
As tragic as disasters are, they can provide a “window of opportunity” for change (Birkmann et 
al., 2010; Kingdon, 1995).  Kingdon (1995) argues that critical times foster distinct avenues of 
problems, policies, and politics that merge to create an advantageous political environment to address 
urban issues.  Birkland (2001) highlights that individual, rapid onset large disasters (such as cyclones 
and floods) act to direct attention towards change where a clear discourse can be narrated by influential 
policy actors.  In the wake of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, Birkmann et al. (2010) argued that 
natural disasters can stimulate such a political environment—a claim supported by the increased DDPM 
budget following the Tsunami. 
In a country like Thailand that has continued to experience water-related disasters, change 
should, in theory, be efficiently incorporated into the policy and planning process.  However, disasters 
do not guarantee change and, therefore, history can repeat itself.  For example, coordination among 
disaster management agencies has been criticized for decades, with little hope for change in the future 
(Maier-Knap, 2015; Huaisai et al., 2006; Shook, 1997).  Beginning with Polterovich (2001), 
institutional traps have been identified to resist change.   
 
3.3 Institutional Traps  
Institutional traps are states that maintain or reinforce a “stable but yet inefficient equilibrium in 
a system where agents choose a norm of behaviour (an institution) among several options” (Polterovich, 
2007, p. 1).  Lebel et al. (2011) illustrates that institutional traps hinder effective flood management in 
Thailand, particularly fragmentation, rigidity, scale, elite capture, and crisis management.   
Fragmentation, rigidity, and elite capture have been further addressed within the literature.  
Reynolds (2012, p. 2) characterized the fragmented government network of agencies as “an entangled 
mass of interlocking relationships, alliance, and struggles between and among many centres of power 
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often in competition with one another.”  This uncoordinated inter-agency web is always present within 
disaster risk management departments (Maier-Knapp, 2015; Foran et al., 2012; Lebel et al., 2011; 
Huaisai et al., 2006; Shook, 1997).  Marks & Lebel (2016) go further and characterize agencies as 
“small kingdoms” that vie for power, and are therefore actively defensive rather than simply neglectful.  
For example, during the 2011 flood, provincial and district authorities were preoccupied with protecting 
their own constituents, which led to limited coordination and left some evacuation centres with plenty 
of supplies while centres in an adjacent area lacked food (Maier- Knapp, 2015).  Fragmentation can also 
impede new initiatives to address disaster management.  The newly created Department for Disaster 
Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM), for example, has been curtailed by other established agencies that 
are unwilling to relinquish responsibilities that had traditionally been theirs (Maier-Knapp, 2015). 
The mentality towards the newly formed DDPM is also characteristic of the rigidity trap where 
agencies believe they know how to handle situations and, therefore, new approaches are unnecessary.  
Agencies are also averse to surprises and are therefore resistant to trying new approaches (Clark & 
Semmahasak, 2013; Allen & Gunderson, 2011).   Blake (2015) notes that the Royal Irrigation 
Department (RID) frequently exploits its symbolic connection to royalty to elicit support for projects 
while silencing opposition or criticism.  By invoking a royal connection he concludes that there is “little 
incentive for the hydraulic bureaucracies or elites to alter the status quo” (2015, p. 660).   
Lebel et al. (2011) argue that elites strive to maintain a status quo that serves their own interests 
and hinders positive change in flood management.  Maier-Knapp (2015, p. 59) further argues that 
“political interests of the political and business elite are the most important and constant factor 
informing decision-making.”  Therefore, elites can influence policies in a manner that is self-serving, 
regardless of the impact their decisions have on others (Kritsanaplan & Sajor, 2011; Lebel et al., 2011).  
Another form of elite capture is corruption, where those in positions of authority abuse their power, 
such as changing land use plans and zoning laws to serve personal interests (Meethom et al. 2014).  
Corruptive practices of government officials have led the King to repeatedly criticise the government as 
“greedy” or “selfish” (Handley, 2006; Blake, 2012). 
Berquist et al. (2015) applied Lebel et al.’s (2011) institutional traps framework to informal 
settlements in Bangkok.  Berquist et al. argued that informal settlements are overcoming rigid 
institutions and private interests through multi-stakeholder networks and integrating scientific 
knowledge, which is reducing the risk of flooding through spontaneous adaptation.  They also proposed 
a sixth institutional trap: overlapping bureaucracies.  However, an institutional network that is 
fragmented will have limited inter-agency communication, which can lead to overlapping 
responsibilities and acts.  Therefore, overlapping bureaucracies should be a subset of the fragmentation 
trap. 
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Lebel et al.’s (2011) institutional traps of scale and crisis management have been largely 
neglected in the literature.  Scale has been addressed narrowly within the Bangkok Metropolitan Region 
(BMR) as the BMA disregards how its actions will affect areas beyond their jurisdiction, and vice 
versa.  During the 2011 flood, for example, the BMA implemented strategies that were detrimental to 
neighbouring provinces because they unnecessarily refused to lower their floodgates to help release 
water from upstream provinces (Kamoljev, 2014).  On the other hand, while the BMA designated a 
water catchment area to be left undeveloped, the government of Nonthaburi allowed extensive 
development on adjacent lands, which greatly reduced the effectiveness of the catchment area (Marks, 
2015).   
Research on Thailand’s focus on crisis management has been minimal.  In regards to adapting 
to climate change, Saito (2014) found that climate change issues have not been effectively incorporated 
into any government plans or policies.  Therefore, adaptation continues to be reactive and with limited 
planned direction.    
Issues of scale and crisis management, however, are vital to flood and drought management.  
Without recognizing the inter-related aspects of flood and drought management, effective disaster 
management is impossible.  For example, land use upstream affects communities downstream.  As our 
research will demonstrate, the reverse can also be true—that downstream land uses (eg. the formation 
of a megacity such as Bangkok) can affect upstream communities (eg. by prohibiting irrigation to 
satisfy urban demand).  Furthermore, by perpetually managing crises as they arise, effective preparation 
and disaster risk reduction strategies are underutilized and fail to address the root causes of 
vulnerability. Finally, institutional traps in Thailand have been solely applied to flood management: 
therefore there is a need to review other water-related issues, such as droughts, through the lens of 
institutional traps.  
Research has also focused on public sector actions to manage water resources and how these 
traps affect public sector actions.  We, on the other hand, use Lebel et al.’s (2011) institutional traps to 
evaluate how public sector traps affect the broader community.  We argue that institutional traps within 
public flood and drought management have led to mismanagement and mistrust in the government’s 
ability to manage water, and have fostered broader engagement in flood and drought management, 
specifically in regards to the military, royalty, and the private sector.  However, diversification of 
stakeholders in flood and drought management has had mixed outcomes for Thailand. 
 
3.4 Methods 
 As Thailand continues to experience water-related disasters, Lebel et al.’s (2011) institutional 
traps appear to remain firmly entrenched.    This paper seeks to provide recent examples of these traps 
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from the 2011 flood, the 2015 surface floods in Bangkok, and the widespread drought in 2015.  We 
conducted interviews with officials from federal, provincial, and municipal departments and two 
housing authorities in the Bangkok Metropolitan Region, focusing on the four provinces that abut the 
Chao Phraya River.  Over 40 departments were initially identified to be engaged in flood and drought 
management, climate change, and housing through consultation with local academics, document 
review, web search, and snowball sampling technique.  From these, respondents were purposefully 
selected (Creswell, 2014) based on (1) employment in a department or agency involved in flood 
management and/or housing, (2) responsibility in at least one of the four provinces, and (3) position of 
leadership within their organization.  Nine different agencies responded to this study, which resulted in 
23 interviews.  Semi-structured interviews were conducted between May and June, 2015.
6
  The area of 
responsibility was evenly distributed, with two to four responded from each of the four provinces and 
12 respondents with regional perspectives.  Eighteen 30-60 minute interviews were conducted in-person 
and five email interviews were conducted.  The language these interviews were conducted in was 
determined by the respondent, which was either in English, or Thai with the aid of an interpreter.  After 
interviews were conducted, we transcribed, coded, and used NVivo to identify reoccurring themes. 
To supplement interview responses, a media review was conducted.  Media is widely 
recognised as influencing public and policymaker opinion (Ahchong and Dodds, 2012; Wanta, Golan, 
& Lee, 2004; Cook et al., 1983; McCombs & Shaw, 1972), and provides information on current events.  
Since Thailand has a high literacy rate of 93.5% (UNICEF, 2013) and the Office of Non-Formal and 
Informal Education (ONIE) has almost 30,000 newspaper reading centres to increase adult learning 
(ONIE, nd.), newspapers were selected for review.  Specific newspapers were chosen to provide a 
representative sample of newspapers with different geographic focus (Bangkok/Thailand), language 
(Thai/English), and intended audience, as well as widespread readership.  This resulted in two 
newspapers in English (reviewed from May 20—August 7, 2015) and four newspapers in Thai 
(reviewed from June 7 to August 7, 2015).
7
  Articles were collected on natural disasters (n=723), 
climate change (n=56), housing (n= 125), and other relevant topics (n=20).   English newspapers were 
reviewed and coded for latent and manifest content, while Thai newspapers were reviewed and coded 
for manifest content by a Thai assistant.  Data were coded and analyzed in Microsoft Excel. 
 
 
                                                             
6 Interviews were conducted with officials from the following agencies: the centralized government departments of the Department of 
Public Works Town and Country Planning (DTP) and the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM);  the provincial 
departments of the Provincial Administration Organization (PAO), City Planning Department (CPD), Department of Environment (DoE), and 
Bangkok Fire and Rescue Department (BFRD); the municipal department of city planning; and the national housing organizations of the 
National Housing Authority (NHA) and Community Organization Development Institution (CODI). 
7 Newspapers reviewed included: Bangkok Post (English, Bangkok focus), The Nation (English, national focus), Post Today (Thai, Bangkok 
focus), Kom Chand Luek (Thai, national focus), Thai Rath (Thai, national focus), and Matichon (Thai, national focus). 
19 
 
3.5 Results 
Flood and drought management were major topics in Thailand in 2015.  A total of 454 articles 
were associated with water-related articles in Thailand (WRAT), including 198 from English 
newspapers and 255 from Thai newspapers.  Water-related reports which were based in Thailand made 
the front page 20% of the time in newspapers in English, while for newspapers in Thai the presence of 
front page reports rises to 43%; with the Kom Chad Luek newspaper placing the highest value on front 
page reporting at 51% of the days, while water-related reports made the front page of the Bangkok Post 
only 18% of the time.  Within these reports, and confirmed and expanded by interview respondents, the 
prominence and impact of institutional traps emerged. Table 3 illustrate key examples of institutional 
traps from the literature and the results of the interviews, while Appendix 6 provides the key results 
from the newspaper review. 
 
3.5.1 The Presence of Institutional Traps 
Fragmentation Trap 
 The fragmentation trap is based on “assumptions of contest and absence of shared interest” that 
create a closed environment and limit meaningful participation with other groups (Lebel et al., 2011, p. 
47), and remains an obstacle to effective flood management in Thailand (Berquist et al., 2015; Maier-
Knap, 2015).  Fragmentation can only exist in the presence of multiple organizations (Berquist et al., 
2015; Lebel et al., 2011).   One respondent commented, “We have too many [agencies], too many” 
(Respondent #8).  Newspapers in Thailand identified over 40 government organizations that are 
engaged in flood and/or drought management.  While two-thirds of water-related articles in Thailand 
reported on two or more agencies, each agency was reported on separately rather than reporting on the 
interactions between agencies.  Reported interactions between agencies were rare, and limited to the 
delegation of action from centralized agencies (Saritdet, 2015; The Nation, 2015c) or conflict (Patsara, 
2015; Saritdet, 2015).  Much more common is the situation highlighted by one respondent who stated, 
“There is no unity in water management, it concerns many agencies” (Respondent #4).   
Instead of working together, agencies compete against each other. As one respondent 
mentioned in regards to a new ministry that was being formulated, the Ministry of Water Resources:  
[Government ministries and departments] push for new initiatives, the big budgets…[but] 
today we still don’t see that structure of administration because they are still fighting 
against each other, [about] who should be under the new department. Even in our 
department, it was discussed. (Respondent #6) 
Lebel et al. (2011) note that without open lines of communication between organizations trust, respect, 
cooperation, and a myriad of other beneficial inter-agency characteristics cannot develop to create an 
effective, integrated flood management plan. 
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Table 3: Institutional Traps. Evidence of Thailand’s Ensnarement (adapted from Lebel et al., 2011, p. 48) 
Trap General Description Evidence from the literature Evidence from our research 
Fragmentation Separatism and competition 
leads to limited interaction 
between agencies, reduced 
institutional capacity, and 
gaps in service provision. 
 The former director of the Thai Meteorological 
Department claimed the RID, EGAT, and the Thai 
Meteorological Department failed to submit 
appropriate retention and release figures (Maier-
Knapp, 2015); 
 Line agencies are resistant to having their areas of 
responsibility or resources infringed upon by the 
DDPM (Lebel et al., 2011). 
 “There is no unity in water management, it 
concerns many agencies” (Respondent #4); 
 “There's a canal that drains water into the Chao 
Phraya river, but [the BMA] shut the canal” to 
protect themselves (Respondent #3); 
 Media report on department actions independently 
from each other, if within a single article. 
Rigidity Strict adherence to a modus 
operandi and aversion to risk 
that limited flexibility and 
institutional learning 
 The RID invokes its symbolic royal connection in 
order to maintain the status quo of project criticism 
(Blake, 2015); 
 Agencies tend to disregard how their work may 
impact other agencies (Huaisai et al., 2006). 
 Flood and drought management continues to focus 
on structural measures (Supoj, 2015a; The Nation, 
2015g), an approach recognized by 14 respondents; 
 A rigid view of departmental rolls led to mistrust 
between departments (Patsara, 2015). 
Elite Capture Elites use their power to 
direct limited resources that 
serve interests 
 National resources are concentrated towards 
protecting Bangkok (Maier-Knapp, 2015); 
 Politicians change land use plans and zoning laws 
to serve personal interests (Meethom et al., 2014). 
 Prioritize the residents of Bangkok over rural 
residents (Sasithorn, 2015b; Respondent #6); 
 “The first group of people made to sacrifice so 
there is enough water for city dwellers such as 
Bangkok residents …are the farmers” (Bangkok 
Post, 2015g); 
 Informal settlements are used as scapegoats for 
urban flooding (Holloway, 2015; Respondent #4, 
7). 
Scale Responsibility is strictly 
limited to a single level or 
geographic area 
 The BMA implemented strategies during the 2011 
flood that were inconsiderate of neighbouring 
provinces (Kamojvey, 2014); 
 While the BMA designated a water catchment area, 
the government of Nonthaburi to the north allowed 
extensive development which greatly reduced the 
effectively of the catchment area (Marks, 2015). 
 A highly hierarchical government structure and 
limit local governments ability to adapt (Supoj, 
2015a; Respondent #12, 23). 
 
Crisis 
Management 
A focus on reacting to 
current disasters, to the 
determine to proactive long-
term planning 
 Post 2004 Tsunami focus of prevent and 
preparedness was short lived (Lebel el al., 2011) 
 Disasters are used for political gain (Lebel et al., 
2011) 
 Focus on relief and repair strategies has cause 
longer-term initiatives to be neglected (Lebel et al., 
2009) 
 
 Policy-makers are present focused (Respondent 
#6); 
 Media focuses on current events, with 67% of 
natural disaster reports occurring within a week of 
rapid on-set events; 
 Only 10% of media reports on water-related 
disasters mentioned recovery or adaptation 
initiatives. 
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Competition can also lead to territorialism where agencies become defensive of their area of 
activity or influence. Defence of a geographic area was widespread during the 2011 flood as areas 
attempted to protect themselves from advancing floodwaters.  “Everyone was afraid so they block their 
areas, so there was a buildup of water,” one respondent lamented (Respondent #8).  In Nonthaburi, for 
example, “There's a canal that drains water into the Chao Phraya river, but [the BMA] shut the canal” 
saving themselves from flooding, while condemning their neighbours to endure the higher flood waters 
for a longer period of time (Respondent #3).   
A political territorial dispute surfaced in during the June 2015 surface floods in Bangkok 
between the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) and the central government.  After 
successive surface floods, the Prime Minister stepped in and ordered the military to help prepare for and 
drain any future floods (Saritdet, 2015).  While military support is not uncommon during disaster 
events, for a localized flood to require military assistance is unusual.  One report stated, “Future floods 
might decide who is better at reacting—the military or the BMA.  The Democrats are no doubt hoping 
the soldiers do not outdo officials and workers under [the Governor’s] command when the full-on rainy 
season arrives” (Saritdet, 2015).  Rather than working together, the military and the BMA’s efforts to 
extend or protect their agency’s’ responsibility, hinders any meaningful collaboration between the two 
institutions to reduce flood risk for residents. 
 There are however, some positive interactions between actors.  For example, the King 
dispatched some of his personal rainmaking aircrafts to help the RID’s effort to artificially generate 
rainfall (Bangkok Post, 2015c).  However, government agencies remain fragmented, which continues to 
plague Thailand and prolongs any attempt at effective flood and drought management. 
 
Rigidity Trap 
  The rigidity trap is characterized by inflexible practices or assumptions.  Lebel et al. 
(2011, p. 50) state, “Floods are assumed to be bad; even modest perturbations for which learning 
could occur are excluded” because institutions believe they already know what should be done.   
 Flood management has traditionally occurred through structural measures in Thailand.  
Since the 2011 flood, the National Water Resources Committee developed a Water Management 
Strategies for 2014-2026, which include 12 strategies to address flood management, 11 of these 
are structural strategies (The Nation, 2015e).  Another three-year flood management and flood 
control plan seeks to improve 75km of waterways and raise 13 embankments to prevent floods 
(The Nation, 2015e).  After the repeated surface floods in Bangkok in 2015, Governor 
Sukhumbhand attempted to re-instill faith in his administration by highlighting current and 
planned drainage infrastructure (The Nation, 2015e) and proclaimed that “[we] will seek a budget 
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of 22 billion baht
8
 from the government to build dams along canals across the city and more giant 
tunnels to drain floods” (Supoj, 2015a).  While we recognize that structural measures are a vital 
part of flood prevention, Thailand’s rigid approach to focus almost solely on structural measures 
to reduce flood risk creates an impossible task, since nature cannot be completely controlled. 
On the other hand, during the 2015 drought the government was engaged in developing 
numerous non-structural measures, including compensation, debt-relief, and water conservation 
practices.  There were over twice as many references to non-structural measures than structural in the 
media (92 to 42 respectively). Unfortunately, their presence in the media was due to their controversial 
implementation which many deemed ineffective or insufficient (Bangkok Post, 201k; The Nation, 
2015d).  Conversely, structural measures, such as well digging, cloud seeding, and expanding irrigation 
systems, were more broadly reported and generally supported (Tanatpong, 2015; The Nation, 2015d; 
Wasaman, 2015).  Therefore, Thailand continues to focus on structural measures.  
 It could be argued, however, that learning had occurred after the 2011 flood, particularly in dam 
management. The 2011 flood was linked to the high water levels in dams, which was used to provide 
irrigation during the dry season and support power generation (Poaponsakom & Meethom, 2013).  
Responding to that experience, the government reduced water levels to ensure adequate capacity to 
retain monsoon rains by releasing the most water in 15 years (Bangkok Post, 2015b).  However, fear 
rather than learning has driven this shift, and led many to consider it an overreaction that led to the 2015 
drought.  One report noted that the Strategic Committee for Water Resource Management was afraid of 
a “repeat of the disastrous 2011 flood” and “[ordered] the release of too much water from reservoirs” 
(Aprinya, 2015).  The chief of the Royal Irrigation Department, which is responsible for dam 
management, stated that the release of 14 billion cubic metres led to the 2015 drought (Bangkok Post, 
201b).    Therefore, dam management has not necessarily effectively learned from the 2011 flood. 
Rigidity is present in policymaking as well.  For example, the National Reform Committee 
(NRC) was working on a water management bill that merged a bill from the Department of Water 
Resources (DWR) and members of the public (Patsara, 2015).  However, the chairman of the NRC 
stated that he “did not trust the cabinet to review the NRC bill sensibly,” because “some state 
organizations were refusing to change the way they handled water management and these groups were 
likely to influence the cabinet’s decision” (Patsara, 2015). The report goes on to state, “while the NRC 
was deliberating this merged draft a different bill, tabled by the DWR, was hurriedly proposed and 
passed by the cabinet” (Patsara, 2015).  The political maneuvering by the DWR and the cabinet to 
undermine the NRC’s joint bill illustrates competition between agencies, as well as limited public 
                                                             
8 Approx. 620 million USD. 
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participation, which Lebel at al. (2011) and Berquist et al. (2015) argue is a vital component to escape 
intuitional traps.   
Therefore, Thailand remains set in its ways.  While some learning has occurred in response the 
2011 flood, it produced an overreaction and contributed to the 2015 drought.  Nevertheless Thailand 
remains focused on structural approaches to reduce the risk of floods and droughts, even after repeated 
failures.   
  
Elite Capture 
 Elite capture, in regards to disaster management, is when “disaster management is organized in 
such a way that it makes it easy for elites to deploy experts and technical tools in ways that serve their 
interest and not those of less politically empowered and socially vulnerable groups” (Lebel et al., 2011, 
p. 52; see also Graham & Marvin, 2001).   
One of the most marginalized groups, informal settlers, are widely blamed for flood problems in 
Bangkok.  One citizen defended the Governor of Bangkok during the surface floods in 2015, saying: 
Instead of blaming the governor, authorities should remove all houses built illegally along 
the river and canal.  I am sure that the residents of these illegal structures are the main 
culprits by throwing their garbage into the canal (Holloway, 2015). 
Furthermore, following the 2011 flood, the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, with support from 
the central government, has begun a campaign to remove these settlements from riverbanks and 
alongside canals (Berquist et al., 2015, Respondent #4).  However, one respondent, who is responsible 
for overseeing their resettlement, commented, “How much [informal settlements] obstruct or encroach, 
isn't academically agreed upon” (Respondent #4).  Furthermore, canal encroachment is not limited to 
the urban poor; as another respondent mentioned, housing developers “always build on top of those 
canals, you know, they don't care to divert it, they just fill up the area” (Respondent #7).  However, 
only the urban poor are being forced to relocate away from canals, while wealthier residents are 
allowed continue to fill in canals elsewhere.  
 Elite capture is also the philosophy that encourages vast infrastructural investment in protecting 
Bangkok, the nation’s economic hub, from flooding.  As a city official commented, “People still have a 
bad image of the big flood so they have the idea, ‘the government has to protect the City of Bangkok so 
the center of Bangkok is safe’” (Respondent #6).  Or as one report articulated, “Bangkok, as the capital, 
is always in the safe zone whenever there is a crisis” (Sasithorn, 2015b).  While the 2011 and 2015 
floods in Bangkok illustrate that Bangkok is not an invincible “safe zone,” it is supported by national 
level interests that continue to invest in improving Bangkok’s flood protection. While, there are plenty 
of valid arguments to protect Bangkok, flood walls and sluice gates can essentially turn Bangkok into a 
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fortress during a flood, as the gates close and armed guards line the walls to ensure flood waters remain 
in areas beyond the City limits (Poaponsakom & Meethom, 2012).   
The same charge was laid against Bangkok during the 2015 drought when farmers were forced to 
watch (under military presence at times) water flow past in the canal to quench the desires of 
Bangkok’s residents.  The Bangkok Post, for example, reported: 
Obviously, most people in Bangkok and other cities are not affected by drought and, 
therefore, are unaware of the plights of the compatriots in rural areas who struggle almost 
on a daily basis just to get hold of water for consumption. (Bangkok Post, 2015d) 
Or, as another report mentions, “The Prime Minister, like every Thai, refers to farmers as ‘the 
backbone of the nation.’ But when it truly matters, meaning now, rural people get less attention 
when they deserve more” (Bangkok Post, 2015a).  The lack of awareness of Bangkok residents 
is, perhaps, reinforced by the lack of local media coverage, since Bangkok-focused newspapers 
published 26% fewer reports on the drought than nationally-focused newspapers.  On the other 
hand, the Bangkok Post reported military involvement in flood and drought management issues 
significantly more than The Nation, largely in an attempt to reassure Bangkok residents of a 
sufficient water supply.  The lack of attention resulted in unchanged water use behaviour, as one 
report noted, “The first group of people made to sacrifice so there is enough water for city 
dwellers such as Bangkok residents for consumption—quite freely and wastefully, too—are the 
farmers” (Bangkok Post, 2015g).  That report, and two similar reports, sparked a high-profile 
criticism of drought management in Thailand, which exposed inequalities in the provision of 
water.  As one  report summarized, “the government has forced farmers to bear the burden of the 
water crisis by banning agricultural water use without substantial water-saving measures in urban 
areas” (Apinya & Manop, 2015 ). However, only nine days later the media dropped the subject.   
 When the interests of the elite are put before everyone else, there is incentive for those in with 
power to maintain the status quo, which serves those with power and disadvantages the less fortunate 
(Blake, 2015). 
 
Scale 
 The scale trap concentrates actions to a single administrative level (Lebel et al., 2011).  In a 
highly centralized country, such as Thailand (Bowornwathana, 2010), scale traps are especially evident, 
as national agencies have greater involvement at local levels. 
 Thailand’s centralized control of flood and drought management are evident in interview 
responses and corroborated by media reports.  When respondents were asked who is responsible to 
reduce flood risk, national agencies were most frequently mentioned, followed by provincial, and then 
local authorities.  Of the over 40 different water-related agencies mentioned in the media, centralized 
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agencies accounted for 75% of all agencies, and occupied 18 of the top 20 most mentioned agencies.  
Even in Bangkok, the governor has to request funds from the central government in order to expand the 
city’s drainage infrastructure (Supoj, 2015a).   
 While centralized control can provide effective management (Macintosh, 2013), it can also 
slow down a system.  Frustrated with central agencies’ slow progress, one respondent mentioned, 
We have studies, we have satellite photos, we have looked at which area is prone to 
flood…But regarding implementation, well, there are limitations from the central 
authorities. Like when we want to study erosion in this area to implement and do 
something, the central authorities…say that they are studying it. The local authorities 
cannot conduct an overlapping study. We’re waiting for them to do things but they still 
haven’t done anything. (Respondent #23) 
Required to wait for centralized direction, local authorities are forced to delay action rather than moving 
forward on their own to adapt to local flood or, in this case, erosion risk. 
 In contrast, one respondent mentioned the speed at which the private sector can act.  In regards 
to acquiring land, he/she stated, “For us, it's very time consuming, at least one year. While [the private 
sector] can buy in one day…But you know, sometimes running a business deals with secrets,” while in 
the public sector, “development must be legal” (Respondent #12).  While public agencies have to 
comply with regulations and a hierarchical chain of command, the private sector can cut through 
regulations through “secret” deals. 
 While Lebel et al. (2011) and Berquist et al. (2015) view the scale trap as hierarchical, it can 
also be applied geographically and temporally.  The geographic scale trap refers to a restricted 
geographic scope of policies.  For example, the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration desires to reduce 
surface flood risk and has implemented an incentive for developments to collect and store precipitation 
during a storm and release it afterwards (BMA, 2013).  However, this incentive only applies to new 
high-rise developments.  This neglects new low- and medium-density development as well as the vast 
stock of existing building that could be retrofitted with water collection systems, such as rain barrels or 
rain gardens, to help reduce the risk of surface flooding.   
Nationally, Thailand’s Environment Impact Assessment’s requirement of stormwater retention 
ponds applies to housing projects greater than 500 plots or 16 ha and condominiums with 80 units or 
more or which are at least 0.4ha in size (MNRE, 2010, Article 3, Annex 1.3.28,31).  Therefore, many 
developers will build 79 units to avoid this requirement (Respondent #13).  By ignoring small and med-
size developments a vast amount of developments are released from providing public benefits of water 
retention.  
Temporally, officials seek immediate actions.  Following the 2011 flood, the Flood 
Management Master Plan was hastily completed in a few months (Poaponsakom & Meethom, 2012).  
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However, its quick completion has resulted in it being repeatedly “delayed and changed,” which 
lowered the public’s trust in the government’s ability to manage water (Erich, 2015).  In Bangkok, “The 
Governor had vowed in 2010 to solve the capital’s flood problem in the next five years” (Sasithorn, 
2015a), but addressing such a complex issue is an ambitious statement that reflects Lebel et al.’s (2011) 
assessment of government officials providing simplistic promises.   
Therefore, Thailand’s policy framework regarding various water-related issues remains 
narrowly focused, hierarchically, geographically, and temporally. 
 
Crisis Management 
 Crisis management is when “policy and political attention only focuses on flood and disaster 
management in emergencies and immediately after serious events” (Lebel et al., 2011, p. 53) rather 
than on preparation and prevention.  Policy- and decision-makers continue to focus on the present, 
which hinders the formation and implementation of long-term plans.  As one respondent commented: 
[Decision-makers] don’t think about future, just tomorrow, not next year or the next five 
years….For my colleagues it is just next week… and that’s the weak point for decision 
making and because most decision-makers cannot think about long future. That’s a 
problem…they are still talking about short term solutions, everything is short term. We are 
planners, we have to be able to see the future, really, really far future, and so that we can 
tell what should be done today to stop problems in the future. (Respondent #6) 
Short-sighted views of disaster management have, in part, been attributed to the media’s focus on 
disaster crises (Quarantelli, 1991). In Thailand, 67% of news reports of rapid onset natural disasters 
(such as surface floods, landslides, and subsidence) occurred within the first week after the event and 
then interest moved to the next story.  Furthermore, only 20% of water-related English newspaper 
articles mentioned efforts to recover to pre-event status and 16% mentioned actions to adapt or improve 
beyond the pre-event condition.  In Thai newspapers, only 2.7% of articles noted attempts to improve 
conditions in order to prepare for another event.  Newspapers therefore either neglect to report 
adaptation or build-back-better actions, or there is limited action taken by the government to facilitate 
long-term actions to reduce risk.  Either way, since media is an influential source for policy-makers 
(Ahchong and Dodds, 2013), the lack of long-term planning in the media hinders improvements in 
flood and drought management and perpetuates a crisis mentality. 
 Lebel et al. (2011) argue that there is limited preparation taken to reduce the risk of flash and 
seasonal floods, which is evident in responses to the 2015 surface floods in Bangkok.  The first surface 
flood, in March, could be argued as unexpected and thus caught the BMA unprepared, since 10% of 
Bangkok’s annual rainfall (141mm) fell in just four hours two months before the typical start of the 
rainy season (Fernquest, 2015; Supoj, 2015a).  The June flash floods, however, are evidence of a crisis 
management mentality.  As one report noted, “The BMA has retrieved more than 10 tonnes of garbage 
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from pipes and sieves at Bangkok pump stations every time city officials rush to facilitate the flow of 
water out of the capital” (Natthapat, 2015).  The fact that the drainage system had 10 tonnes of debris 
clogging the system illustrates a lack of preparation, even towards a known risk such as regular 
monsoon rains.  
 On the other end of the water spectrum, the drought in 2015 also caught the Thai government 
seemingly unprepared, regardless of early reports of an El Nino year, which would delay and reduce 
rainfall.  There was no systematic response to help farmers cope with the drought, as disaster relief 
actions were debated during the event.  Two months after the failed start of the monsoon season, a news 
report dated July 30, 2015 outlined the Government’s water conservation plan: “a set of short-term 
water conservation measures to be applicable at all government units and state enterprises effective Oct. 
1” (Bangkok Post, 2015m).  Essentially, the water conservation plan consisted of a 10% reduction in 
water consumption in state agencies, which could be achieved through fixing leaks and no longer 
providing tea or coffee at meetings and only encouraging the public to reduce water consumption.  
Therefore, two months after the failed start of the monsoon season, the government approved a highly 
focused water conservation plan (scale trap), to commence in another two months to coincide with a 
new fiscal year.  To add perspective, the announcement of the government’s water conservation plan 
comes on the same day that the governor of Chaiyaphum, in northeast Thailand, declared over 80% of 
his province a disaster zone due to the drought (Bangkok Post, 2015m).   
 Therefore, the Thai government, as well as the BMA, continue to focus on crisis management 
rather than disaster prevention.  Even though seasonal monsoons bring predictable rainfall, the BMA 
continues to react to heavy rainfalls rather than proactively maintaining drainage infrastructure.  
Thailand, similarly, has experienced numerous droughts in the past, but has failed to pre-emptively 
develop a systematic plan to ease the impacts, particularly for farmers.  Furthermore, as climate change 
increases the potential for both floods and droughts, under the current crisis management framework, 
the government will continue manage one crises to the next (Achakulwisut, 2015a). 
A report in The Nation (2015f) summarizes these institutional traps and calls for action: 
It is astonishing in this day and age that the country’s resource management remains at the 
mercy of nature’s whims.  Surely we have suffered needlessly through enough crises by 
now that the authorities in charge are acutely aware of the need for sweeping 
improvements.  The management of our water resources must become more effective and 
more systematic.  If not, Thailand is destined to endure the same alternating problems—
drought and flood— endlessly or at least until the forecast effects of climate change render 
such seasonal difficulties moot…It is clear that out state agencies must begin working 
together more effectively to ensure that measures to prevent drought and flooding are in 
place and poised to be implemented promptly.  They should be looking ahead and 
preparing in advance so they’re ready to head off these problems before they turn into 
national emergencies…What the authorities must cease doing is reacting to a problem only 
when it becomes a crisis that can no longer be ignored.  We need wholesale, practice crisis 
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management not the cumulative, after-the-fact, reactions that only serve to fatigue 
resources and deflate public confidence.  Above all, we need a clear and decisive policy on 
water-resource management. 
Without “clear and decisive” flood and drought management policies, the public sector remains 
ensnared and the government continues as usual.   
 
3.5.2 Outcomes of Institutional Traps 
 In addition to the presence of institutional traps in flood and drought management, newspapers 
and interview respondents mentioned how these traps influence broader land-use practices.  Three 
issues in particular stand out: the mismanagement of water, a lack of trust in the government, and a 
broader framework of water governance. 
 
Flood and Drought Mismanagement 
 Flood and drought management, or mismanagement, were a popular topic in the media 
and among interview respondents.  In newspaper reports on water-related topics within Thailand, 
10% of English news articles and 5% of Thai news articles reported water mismanagement as the 
reason for impacts from water-related events.  On the other hand, mismanagement was never 
mentioned as a reason for impacts in news articles from beyond Thailand.  Water 
mismanagement include developing on floodplains (Witpatayotin, 2015), neglecting forecasts 
(Wancharoen & Jikkham, 2015; Yongcharoenchai, 2015; Respondent #20); mismanaging dam 
and water supply (Achakuwisut, 2015; Bangkok Post, 201e), and exploiting groundwater 
(Osathanon, 2015).   
 During the 2011 flood, one respondent mentioned that the “government [water] management 
isn’t good enough because the affected area was a large area, so [people] have to help themselves, some 
stayed in the same house” (Respondent #1).  Four years later, during the drought, another respondent 
stated: 
The cause of natural disasters is ineffective management to deal with it. Let me point out 
the universal image which is the water management, both for flooding and drought. It 
should be done urgently. At this time we’re experiencing drought which can lead to famine 
because farmers cannot plant anything. It’s because we don’t have a reservoir to store 
water when it doesn’t rain. You can look at the map of Thailand to see that there are lots of 
lowland areas but we cannot manage to build water reservoirs or dams as we’ve planned. 
And that’s the reason for flooding and droughts in Thailand. (Respondent #14) 
An inability to develop planned infrastructure or implement flood or drought relief is further 
evident in a simple review of newspaper headlines: “Water management has been neglected for 
too long” (Sasithorn, 2015b), “Drought ideas smack of desperation” (Achakulwisut, 2015b), 
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“Flood, then drought—the never-ending cycle” (The Nation, 2015f), and “[Government] 
stumbles from one crises to another” (Achakulwisut, 2015a). 
 
Lack of Trust 
 The Thai government continues to struggle to effectively manage water, and it is in the 
presence of poor management that mistrust toward the government’s ability to protect the nation 
against water-related disasters has developed.  One responded stated: 
Every year we may have one or two storms; most of them are just tropical…but in that 
year there were five to six storms passing Thailand. And still they say ‘it’s uncommon, [or 
a] unusual case, so don’t talk about risk.’ I remember in May I presented about climate 
change and the impact on storms. By that time I was sure there were big storms coming 
from the east. And in that year in May, the provinces north of Bangkok like Pichit were 
already under water. If you look at the water table, if you were working in this field you 
could tell that something is unusual…And in the first week of October, [it was] absolutely 
clear that water would come to the inner city. In the first week of October, Nonthaburi, the 
upper part of Bangkok, many districts have been underwater. But the Governor of 
Bangkok kept saying ‘no problem, no problem’… In short I can tell you that the people 
don’t believe in the government because of the poor structure of management.  
(Respondent #6) 
Or as another respondent commented about the flow of information during the 2011 flood: “Quite often 
the government doesn’t give factual information… even just how much water is going to come is not 
revealed in the facts” (Respondent #23). 
 As noted above, the Chairman of the National Reform Committee mistrusted the government 
due to influential people or organizations; mistrust, however, is not confined to the public sector.  Eight 
news articles, seven of which were from the municipally-focused Bangkok Post, explicitly noted 
mistrust towards the Central Government.  A research director at the Thailand Development Research 
Institution (TDRI), for example, stated, “Manufacturers in the flood-troubled region do not have 
confidence in the government’s Bt350-billion water management plan, because it has been delayed and 
changed so often” (Erich, 2015).   
 On the other end of the water spectrum, during the 2015 drought, industries and 
individuals work to supply their own water needs.  Amata, a company that manages 7,500ha of 
industrial property across three estates notes that “supply is often a concern in Thailand. 
Although the country has a monsoon season when it rains heavily, there is also a dry season 
when it may not rain for weeks or even months. This often creates critical water shortages 
throughout the country” (Amata, 2010).  As a result they have created a 14 million m3 reservoir 
at their Nakorn facility and a 3.5 million m
3
 reservoir at the Amata City facility. During the 2015 
drought, they reassured investors that their properties “[would] not run dry” (Apisitniran, 2015).   
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 Farmers on the other hand where forced to watch canals and river slowly run dry.  As a 
result, Farmers are experimenting with desalination strategies in an effort to become self-
sufficient (Jikkam, 2015).  While the successes of these experiments were limited, the fact that 
they desired to become self-reliant illustrates a lack of trust in the public sector’s ability to 
provide water to irrigate their fields.   
The lack of trust in the government should not be a surprise since the International 
Institute for Management Development (IMD) ranked Thailand’s “trust in politicians” a mere 
129 out of 144 and “transparency of government policymaking” a 100 out of 144 (IMD, 2015).   
  
Broadening Flood and Drought Governance 
 While government authorities remained trapped, other actors have begun to fill the void, 
in part, due to water mismanagement and lack of trust in the government.  They include the 
military, royalty, and the private sector.  The military are also taking a larger role in flood and 
drought management, beyond their current role as governing the country through a Junta 
government.  While the military was never mentioned by interview respondents, in English 7.6% 
of water-related reports in Thailand noted military involvement in three key roles; disaster relief, 
enforcement, and planning.  The military is frequently called upon during natural disasters to 
help provide aid and relief, and this continues to be a role for the Thai military during the 2015 
surface floods in Bangkok (The Nation, 2015b) and the drought (Bangkok Post, 2015j).  The 
military was also used during the drought to maintain order and compliance with government 
directives, especially in regards to bans on pumping water from canals for agricultural purposes 
(Bangkok Post, 2015f).  While disaster relief and enforcement have been a traditional role for the 
Thai military, they are also moving into a planning role.  Following the surface floods in 
Bangkok in June, 2015, the Central Government proposed that if the Bangkok Metropolitan 
Authority could not plan and implement an effective flood management system, the role to 
protect Bangkok from floods would be shifted to the military (Wancharoen & Jikkham, 2015).  
Furthermore, the military are portrayed positively as an institution that gets things done.  
However, it is important to note that at the time of writing Thailand was ruled by a Junta 
government, and therefore speaking negatively about the military is highly suppressed (see 
Bhromsuthi et al., 2015).  Therefore, the military is posed to step into a planned role that has 
traditionally been publically helped.   
The Thai Royal Family, especially King Bhumibol Adulyadej, has also become active in 
water management.  Blake (2015) highlights how the Royal Irrigation Department (RID) 
involves a symbolic connection to royalty to maintain the status quo.  Aligning oneself with 
royalty could be advantageous since all media reports that mentioned royal initiated flood and 
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drought management schemes, and provided a critic of their actions, portrayed royalty 
positively,
9
 while only 38% of government actions were viewed positively.   For example, the 
government’s attempt to create rain was criticized as insufficient and unsuccessful (Taylor, 
2015); however, when the king dispatches some of his personal rainmaking planes to Northern 
Thailand his actions were praised (Bangkok Post, 2015c).  While action by the military and 
royalty are widely praised, the government’s actions are only praised 38% of the time.   
The private sector has also stepped into managing water.  Evaluation from the media and 
interview respondents of the private sectors involvement in water management is split between 
positive and negative assessments.  Therefore, we will review both in detail in the following 
sections. 
  
Disreputable Practices 
 Media and interview respondents noted numerous illegal or disreputable practices, 
including developers taking advantage of loopholes in land use polices, corruption, and theft. 
While not illegal, three interview respondents noted housing developers exploiting loopholes in 
planning regulations.  Comprehensive plans, for example, are created to direct orderly 
development through defining land uses, typically at the provincial level.  However, as one 
respondent explained, comprehensive plans are only in effect for a particular period of time and 
when they expire any development can occur on any land, unless the local authorities voluntarily 
maintain the land use (Respondent #20).  The same respondent noted that developers will delay 
construction, knowing a plan will expire and they will be freed from land use constraints.  In fact, 
one news report stated, "There were 195 city plans nationwide, 93 of which have expired and are 
in a vacuum period" (Katharangsiporn, 2015).  Therefore, another respondent stated:  
There’s a mixed use of industries and housing, the issue of using containers, issue of using 
agricultural land to build houses, because there were no urban plans.  Like the Rojana 
industrial complex, [it was] built when the urban planning law wasn’t in place, [the 
developers] knew but [they] just want to do it. So there are problems, always. (Respondent 
#8) 
Therefore the lack of strong land use policies has led to uncoordinated development, much of 
which has been within the central floodplain (Lebel et al., 2012; Poaponsakorn & Meethom, 
2012).  However, in July, 2015 the government amended the comprehensive plan legislation, and 
removed the expiration clause, thus ensuring that current land use plans will not expire; however, 
the status of plans that have lapsed is unknown (Katharangsiporn, 2015). 
                                                             
9 However, it is important to note that defaming royalty is illegal in Thailand, and therefore it should be 
unexpected that there was not negative comments regarding actions taken by royalty.   
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 While exploiting legislation loopholes is not illegal, illegal actions abound in the media 
reports and comments from interview respondents.  The ability to “influence” decision-making 
process, as the chair of the National Reform Committee stated, is not limited to 
intergovernmental interactions.  One respondent stated, “Sometimes running a business deals 
with secrets” (Respondent #11) or, more explicitly, a concerned citizen wrote, “large brown 
envelopes” can alter Environmental Impact Assessment reports (Shepherd, 2015).  During the 
rebuilding phase after the 2011 flood, road repair contracts were criticized as being awarded 
disruptively and to firms that use substandard practices and as a result, many roads failed during 
the 2015 drought as land next to waterways subsided with the dropping water table 
(Prateepchaikul & Attakor, 2015). 
Influencing the decision-making process does not only come from outside of public 
agencies, as one respondent commented: 
The bigger constraint or problem for us is that [owners of industrial estates] are sitting in the 
planning committee in our department; maybe two to three of the 10. And they have strong 
voices, and anytime we would like to ask them [to cooperate], (laugh) no don’t hope or don’t 
expect to see cooperation form these people” (Respondent #6). 
Or as another respondent stated, “The BMA has already developed this open space plan, but of course, 
implementation is a different story…when you want to designate this area as a floodway but the land 
has been bought by politicians…who can pass the law” (Respondent #7).  
 Not everyone seeks to influence policy-makers though; some resort to theft.  During the 
2015 drought, stealing water was a national concern which required military patrons along canals 
and river to ensure water continued to flow downstream to supply water to Bangkok (Bangkok 
Post, 2015f).  Nevertheless, media reports were rife with stories of farmers stealing water 
(Achakulwisut, 2015a, 2015b; Bangkok Post, 2015h; The Nation, 2015g, 2015h; 
Yongcharoenchai, 2015).  However, water theft was not limited to farmers.  A power station 
illegally drained a pond once its water reservoir dried up (Bangkok Post, 2015l). 
 
Positive Outcomes 
 While institutional traps have created a lack of trust in the government and have led some to act 
disreputably, there are positive outcomes from a government that is incapable of providing effective 
flood and drought management.  As mentioned, farmers are attempting to adapt spontaneously, 
specifically through desalination experiments (Jikkam, 2015), as Berquist (2015) proposed.  On a larger 
scale, corporations are getting involved in flood and drought management.  Some have suggested 
farmers switch to more drought resistant crops, such as ma mui, or velvet bean, which has medicinal 
properties (Pisuthipan, 2015).  At the community level, after feeling ignored by the  government, a 
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village rallied together to provide community benefits for themselves, including a library, a police 
kiosk, and banded together during the 2011 flood to construct a sandbag wall to protect their 
community (Wancharoen, 2015). 
 In the private housing sector, some developers have begun to set aside a larger portion of 
their annual revenue to a fund dedicated to repairs (Srimalee, 2015).  Setting funds aside will 
increase a firm’s resilience to natural disasters through a quicker recovery time rather than 
waiting for external financial support to arrive.  However, saving money rather than investing it 
can prove more costly in the future if repairs are unnecessary or where proactive adaptation 
would have reduced damages from a disaster (Kreibich et al., 2005).   
 Non-government organizations have created programs to help with water-related issues.  
For example, the Coca-Cola Foundation Thailand Launched RAKNAM (‘Love Water’), a 
community flood management project, in 2007 to educate and support sustainable flood 
management in local communities (Pimsa-noh, 2015; The Nation, 2015a). 
 While there are examples of positive outcomes from the government’s inability to 
address water issues, they are few.  In fact, the examples above are an exhaustive list of positive 
outcomes that the media reported during the study period, and account for only 3% of water-
related articles.  Moreover, not all private companies choose to adapt.  For example, for large 
condominium developers in Bangkok the aspect that garners the most attention and influence in 
development practice is mass transit lines (Saikapurta, 2015; Srimalee, 2015).  Srimalee (2015) 
stated, "A number of property firms have also launched residential projects in Rangsit, even 
though the location was affected by the devastating flood of 2011,” and goes on to quote the 
Managing Director of Condominiums who believes “home-buyers view the 2011 flood as a 
natural disaster, and it has not affected their decision to buy a home in this location."  Media 
reports on housing in Bangkok highlighted location as a key feature; the most reported indicator 
of location was a development’s proximity to mass transit, as reported by 40% of the articles, 
followed by being located within the central business district at 29%. Furthermore, the potential 
of floods was never stated as a deterrent in building location.   
 
3.6 Discussion 
3.6.1 Land use planning and incomplete decentralization of flood and drought 
management  
 Institutional traps remain deeply rooted in Thailand (Marks & Lebel, 2016; Blake, 2015; 
Mainer-Knapp, 2015; Marks, 2015; Meetham et al., 2014; Clark & Semmahasak, 2013).  In 
recent years the government has downloaded responsibility for local sluice gates and the 
management of canal levels to local authorities; however Marks and Lebel (2016) argue that the 
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process has been incomplete.  As a result, local authorities are left with more responsibility 
without upper-tier support.  Marks and Lebel (2016) argue that this has contributed to a lack of 
land use planning in Central Thailand.  While they, and Saito (2011), argue that government 
gives priority to infrastructure and income generating projects, we have found that officials can 
be influenced on an individual level, such as through corruption.   Results indicate that floods 
have rarely been considered in land use planning, and as a result the Thai government is 
unprepared when floods occur.   
The opposite also appears to be true, that droughts have not been considered, particularly in 
rural land use planning.  When droughts are considered, they are done in connection to irrigation and 
strategies to distribute water to a larger area in order to increase farming capacity.  However, this 
assumes an unlimited supply of water, which was not the case in 2015.  Nevertheless, the Central 
Government continued to promote irrigation expansion during the drought.   
The drought, as it affects Bangkok, was never a viewed as a crisis even though the water level 
of the Chao Phraya River was consistently monitored to ensure adequate water supply.  It was not until 
two months into the drought, when the media began reporting the plight of farmers in contrast to an 
unchanged consumption of water in Bangkok, that attention was directed towards urban drought 
management.  Even when a water conservation program was developed, it was limited to government 
offices and implementation was further delayed.   
Similarly, when land use plans include flood management, Thai agencies lack the capacity to 
enforce them (Maneepong & Webster, 2008).  Lack of enforcement was widely acknowledged among 
interview respondents; however, this was connected to the incapacity of officials to ensure compliance 
with building plans and/or the ability to sway the official opinion through “secret deals”, rather than a 
lack of legislated authority to control development. This aligns with Kritsanaplan & Sajor (2011), who 
found that large land owners or developers have maintained close connections with elected official in 
order to maintain their development freedoms.   
As a result of weak land use planning and poor flood and drought management, other actors are 
filling the role that the government is not, notably the military, royalty, and the private sector. 
 
3.6.2 Stepping into the Flood and Drought Management Vacuum 
Military 
In most countries the military’s presence in times of natural disaster means there has been a 
national emergency that exceed the local capacity to cope.  In Thailand, the military is viewed as a 
method to get things done, at least in regards to flood and drought response.  After the June 2015 
localized floods in Bangkok, many residents began to call on the Junta government to remove the 
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governor of Bangkok and replace him with someone more competent in flood management.  This is not 
to say that the Junta government is widely supported; however, the increased provisions they are 
granted has been recognised as a way to make lasting change in the way water is managed. 
The military in general, are seen to be ready to step in when local authorities are incapable to 
deal with flooding.  The surface floods in Bangkok, which resulted from short, but intense, localized 
precipitation overwhelmed Bangkok’s ability to convey water off of the streets.  As a result, the 
military was called in to create flood management plans and prepare for the possibility that they, rather 
than the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, would be charged with defending Bangkok from 
floods.   
 
Royalty 
 Bhumibol Adulyadej became King in 1946 and ruled until October 2016.  He was active in 
water management for much of his reign and many of Thailand’s flood management features honour his 
involvement (Blake, 2015).  The Royal Irrigation Department, the King’s Dyke (which bars floodwater 
to the north from entering Bangkok), water diversion canals around the City of Hua Hin, the royal 
rainmaking aircrafts, and the royal non-profit organization which lend aid during disaster times all have 
connections to the royal family.  Blake (2015) argues that the King Bhumibol’s reputation and near-
deified status was directly linked to his increasing involvement in water management.  However, if the 
government were capable of managing water, his involvement would be unnecessary.  The repeated 
failure of the Thai government to manage water has created a need which Bhumibol deemed his 
personal mission to fill (Blake, 2015).   
 By striving to transverse the traps that the government is stuck in, King Bhumibol garnered 
support and solidified his position in a world that is quickly viewing royalty as strictly symbolic (Blake, 
2015).  For example, he sent rainmaking planes to the North and providing bottled water during the 
drought and was therefore viewed as a saviour.  As a result, his involvement in flood and drought 
management was essentially unquestioned—regardless of the actual outcome of projects (Blake, 2015).  
However, whether this status was connected to him personally or to his is Kingship is unknown, and 
therefore whether his successor, King Maha Vajiralongkorn, will maintain the status that King 
Bhumibol gained is questionable.   
 
Private Sector 
 The private sector’s involvement in flood and drought management in Thailand has largely 
been neglected by researchers.  Nevertheless, the inability of the government has created an 
environment that is stimulating private sector actions.  As the private sector loses trust in the 
government’s ability to protect against floods and droughts, they are stepping in to become more self-
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reliant.  Farmers are experimenting with desalination techniques in order to provide water to their crops 
rather than relying on the government to store, and effectively manage, dams and canals.  Media results 
indicate that industries have also increased their capacity to cope with droughts and floods by 
stockpiling for their facilities.  While the government fought with falling water levels and the concerned 
public, industries reassured investors that the 2015 drought would not adversely affect them. 
 The private sector is, therefore, adapting in Thailand.  While Birkland et al. (2010) and 
Kingdon (1995) argue that natural disasters can be a catalyst for change within the public sector, we 
found that limited change in the public sector approach has occurred in response to water-related 
disasters due to institutional traps.  It is the private sector, and the military, that are adapting their 
practices in the aftermath of natural disasters. 
 The traps that hinder effective public sector flood and drought management largely do not 
appear to apply to the private sector.  For example, communication between landowners or developers 
is not necessary in order to develop a site, although it may occur if deemed advantageous.  Firms are 
not as rigid as government agencies and are able to change their practices without relying on 
government direction (Keenan, 2015).  Large landowners are, in fact, the elite that influence public 
policies that favour their interest rather than the ones being influenced by public policy (Maier-Knapp 
2015; Kritsanaplan & Sajor, 2011; Lebel et al., 2011).  Furthermore, the private sector is separate from 
issues of scale, insofar as it affects their properties.  Through securing water sources, or increasing 
flood defences, the private sector is adapting to the water-related risks, as opposed to the public sector 
which continues to deal with crises as they arise. 
 In this regard, the private sector is better positioned to adapt to water-related risk than the 
public sector which is ensnared by institutional traps.  However, their adaptations can both hinder and 
help flood and drought management issues.  Private sector actions are driven by a multitude of 
pressures (Hertin, 2003), most of which are self-serving.  As a result, some have employed disreputable 
practice to facilitate actions that support their interests.  For example, by lobbying for greater water-
taking rights, industrial firms guarantee water supply for themselves; while, in the case of the 2015 
drought, farmers experienced delayed or lost income since water was promised to industrial estates.   
 The lack of public oversight in land use planning has, inadvertently, increased the risk to 
private firms by encouraging development in floodplains (Poaponsakorn &  Meethom, 2012), and 
created a need for private sector adaptation in these areas.  However, not all private companies have 
chosen to adapt, not only that, but some are choosing to develop in areas that were flooded in 2011 even 
though little has been done to reduce the risk of flooding to the area. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
Incapacitated by fragmented departments, rigid approaches to flood and drought management, 
prioritized elite, limited scope, and present-oriented planning, the government continues to struggle to 
address a wide range of water-related issues, including floods and droughts.  Results indicate that the 
inability of the public sector to effectively manage water resources has led to water mismanagement 
and lack of trust in the government’s ability to manage water, and as a result flood and drought 
management are moving beyond the public sector and includes the military, royalty, and, most recently, 
the private sector.   
The lack of effective flood and drought management plans have allowed the private sector to 
develop strategies to cope with floods and droughts which may be harmful to areas beyond their 
properties.  Private sector strategies to address floods include circumventing land use plans and using 
corruption to achieve corporate interests, while strategies to address droughts including increasing 
water storage capacity and stealing water if needed.    
However, there are some positive aspects to the limited guidance provided by the government.  
Companies, communities, and individuals are striving to become self-reliant by supplying their own 
water supply or protection measures.   Non-government organizations have also taken up the task to 
improve water resilience, both in terms of supply and protection from floods.  Nevertheless, more 
research is required to understand the long-term implications of increased ad hoc private sector 
participation in flood and drought management. 
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Section 4: Connecting Private Sector Engagement to Practice 
 
 Manuscript 1 built on Lebel el al’s (2011) institutional traps and found that public institutions 
in Thailand remain trapped by fragmentation, rigidity, elite capture, scale, and crisis management.  Not 
only is Thailand trapped in flood management as Lebel et al. (2011) argued, but agencies engaged in 
water management more broadly, such as drought management, are similarly trapped.  As a result, 
institutional traps hinder effective public flood and drought management and have led to water 
mismanagement and subsequently a lack of trust in the government’s ability to effectively manage 
water.  It has also encouraged other actors, specifically royalty, the military, and the private sector, to 
become engaged in flood and drought management.  Regarding the private sector, interview 
respondents and the media provided mixed reviews on the private sector’s involvement in flood and 
drought management.  While the private sector can provide innovative solutions to complicated 
problems, they can also create problems through their flood and drought management approaches.  
Manuscript 2, therefore, seeks to understand strategies a specific sector is using to respond to the 
government’s inability to effectively manage water resources. 
The private sector has widely been recognized as a stakeholder in flood management and 
climate change adaptation (Revi et al., 2014; Leck and Simon, 2013; World Bank, 2010a, 2010b; 
Satterthwaite et al., 2007), but little research has been conducted in Thailand to understand what actions 
the private sector are utilizing to participate in adaptation.  The private housing sector is specifically 
reviewed due to its wide geographic presence, its susceptibility to public pressure, and the ability for 
public sector management through land use planning and building codes.  Manuscript 2, therefore, 
seeks to answer the following questions: 
1. What strategies is the private housing sector employing to reduce their risk of flooding? 
2. How are these strategies perceived by public officials? 
3. What are the potential outcomes of the private housing sector’s adaptation strategies? 
In order to answer these questions, the 2011 flood provides an opportunity to investigate private sector 
adaptation strategies after the public sector failed to manage floodwaters effectively.   
 While Manuscript 1 remained broadly focused on Thailand as a whole, Manuscript 2 focuses 
on the Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR).  The BMR, a rapidly urbanizing megacity, provides an 
ideal case study because the proliferation of housing developments, especially after the 2011 flood 
which inundated parts of the city, and which was never expected to experience widespread riverine 
flooding.  
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Manuscript 2, therefore, investigates what the private housing sector is doing to adapt to 
increased flood risk.  Adaptation strategies are presented and their current and potential impacts to the 
Bangkok Metropolitan Region are reviewed.   
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Section 5: A Flood of Change in Bangkok’s Housing Sector: A Case Study 
on Private Sector Adaptation 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 In 2011, Thailand experienced above average rainfall in every month of the monsoon season, 
but particularly in the second half of the rainy season when rainfall was as high as 128% above the 
normal volume (Takahashi et al., 2015).  As a result, more than two-thirds of the country was flooded, 
which left three million people affected and 1.9 million homes damaged as the floodwater flowed along 
the Chao Phraya River system and Bangkok on its journey to the ocean (World Bank, 2012). Reports of 
flooding in Bangkok made international headlines (Mydnas, 2011; Tass, 2011; Taylor, 2011), partly 
because of the decision of city officials to spare the central business district by releasing flood waters in 
surrounding areas of the Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMA) (Poaponsakorn & Meethom, 2013; 
Fuller, 2011).  
 While the 2011 flood was the worst flood in recent history, flooding is not new to Thailand, 
with other major floods in 1995, 1983, and 1942.  On a smaller scale, annual floods occur throughout 
Thailand and replenish agricultural areas—a vital ecological function for the world’s largest rice 
producing country (ADB, 2012). However, shifts in the frequency, timing, and magnitude of rainfall are 
increasing the risk of floods. 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2014) projects, with high confidence, an 
increase in extreme weather events and ensuing floods, and the United Nations Development 
Programme (2015) concludes climate change will increase losses from natural disasters. Currently, 
floods are the most significant natural hazard that affects people around the world (Jonkman, 2005; 
UNISDR, 2015).  In an average year, there are approximately 200 million people exposed to 
catastrophic flooding across 90 countries (UNDP, 2004), with many times more at risk of minor or 
localized flooding, resulting in approximately 6,300 deaths and over $100 billion in losses (UNISDR, 
2015).  Due to increased risk of flooding, urban centres around the world have started to adapt. 
 In Thailand, many of the projected changes in climate are already underway (Marks, 2012) and 
have led to calls for action.  Bangkok, in particular, is vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and 
has been designated a climate change hotspot (Hijioka et al., 2014; Kreft, and Eckstein, 2014; 
Maplecroft, 2012).  Shift in precipitation regimes, as well as deforestation and urbanization, have 
contributed to flooding becoming commonplace (Poaponsakorn & Meethom, 2013).  This shift in 
precipitation has tested Thailand’s ability to cope with floods and has led to calls to change how water 
is managed from government agencies (Saito, 2014), academics (Lebel et al., 2011), international 
organizations (World Bank, 2012), non-government organizations (Tanatpong, 2015), and the public 
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(Saridet, 2015).  While it is widely recognized that there should be numerous actors engaged in flood 
management, including federal, regional, and municipal governments, non-government organizations 
(NGO), citizen groups, and the private sector (Revi et al., 2014; Leck and Simon, 2013; World Bank, 
2010a, 2010b; Dodman et al., 2009; Satterthwaite et al., 2007), flood management in Thailand 
continues to be viewed, almost exclusively, as a public sector responsibility.  Thailand’s centralized 
government structure means that agencies, such as the Department of Disaster Prevention and 
Mitigation, the Royal Irrigation Department, National Water Management Committee, and municipal 
departments, dominate water governance, and leave little space for non-government actors to be 
incorporated into flood management. As a result, literature has primarily focused on the role of the 
public sector to reduce the risk of flooding.  The private sector is, however, is mentioned less frequently 
in regards to flood management, and when it has been reviewed it is predominantly related to industrial 
development (Haraguchi & Lall, 2013; Aon Bonfield, 2012). 
The private sector, specifically the housing sector, has begun to adapt to the increased risk of 
floods.  Through this paper we demonstrate that the private housing sector is engaged in adaptation 
strategies to reduce the risk of flooding in Bangkok, Thailand.  However, according to public officials 
interviewed, this adaptation is ad hoc, and may prove maladaptive and lead to splintering urbanism. 
 
5.2 Urban adaption responses to climate change  
5.2.1 Urban Flood Risk 
  Urban centers are extremely vulnerable to climate change, with 3,300 coastal cities threatened 
by sea level rise, coastal and riverine flooding, and salinization. The IPCC (2007, p. 12) notes: “the 
most vulnerable industries, settlements and societies are generally those in coastal and river flood 
plains, those whose economies are closely linked with climate-sensitive resources, and those in areas 
prone to extreme weather events, especially where rapid urbanization is occurring.”  All of these factors 
are present in many Southeast Asian cities where coastal urbanization in the norm.  A vulnerability 
assessment of 50 cities worldwide by Maplecroft (2013) determined that nine of the top 10 most at risk 
cities were in South and Southeast Asia, with Bangkok, Thailand ranked second (after Manila, 
Philippines).  Cities that are rapidly urbanizing struggle to manage growth (Roy, 2009), and are 
therefore at an increased risk due to the inability to direct climate change adaptation. 
 In Thailand, changes in lifestyle and livelihood, and the rapid growth of the economy and urban 
centers have increased vulnerabilities to floods across demographics and economic sectors (World 
Bank, 2012; Lebel et al., 2011; Marks, 2011; Lebel & Sinh, 2007).  While rural areas remain vulnerable 
to flooding, land use changes (including deforestation and urban expansion into floodplains) have 
increased the flood risk in urban areas.  Economic transition from agriculture to manufacturing and 
industrial sectors has similarly increased vulnerabilities through industrial promotion policies of the 
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1980s, which located industrial estates on floodplains (Lebel et al., 2012; Poaponsakorn & Meethom, 
2012).  The trend away from primary industries is predicted to increase as climate change reduces the 
viability of agricultural pursuits (IPCC, 2014; Marks, 2011; Kerdsuk, 2009), which will only promote 
the process of rapid urbanization which is currently underway.  
Increased urbanization, primarily in and around Bangkok, has led to changes in urban 
vulnerability to floods (Poaponsakorn & Meethom, 2012; World Bank, 2012).  Between 2000 and 2010 
the population of Bangkok grew from 6.4 million to 8.3 million, a growth of 31% (NSO, 2010).  When 
the whole Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR) is considered, another 2.5 million people moved to the 
area during the same period.  The additional 4.4 million people represent an average annual increase of 
230,000 private households (NSO, 2010).  In an attempt to cope with this influx of residents, many 
canals have been built or paved over, or converted into road to accommodate increased traffic volumes, 
a process that has continued to reduce the city’s ability to convey stormwater for decades (Marome, 
2012; Poaponsakorn & Meethom, 2012; Kenworthy, 1995).  Many new residents, for various economic 
reasons, cannot find adequate housing and end up in informal settlements perched along the edges or 
over of canals and are highly vulnerable to flooding (Yap & De Wanderler, 2010).   
Rapid urbanization has also increased the demand for fresh water for household and industrial 
purposes.  Traditionally, this demand has in large part been fulfilled through exploiting groundwater 
resources.  Excessive groundwater extraction resulted in land subsidence throughout the BMR. By the 
late 1980s, the BMR had subsided between of 20cm to 160cm, with a maximum rate of 12cm/year 
(Dutta, 2011).  Due to government initiatives, subsidence has slowed, which has led the World Bank 
(2012) to hail Bangkok as a success story for groundwater control. Yet it also recognizes that the 
megacity continues to subside at a rate of 1cm/year, primarily due to groundwater extraction (World 
Bank, 2010a), which continues to increase the risk of flooding.   
In lowlands, like the BMR, with an elevation of 1-2m above sea level, any subsidence will 
increase the risk of floods.  As the land continues to subside, the ability to drain the area is hampered, 
an effect that is compounded by the loss of permeable surfaces and stormwater conveyance capacity.  
Furthermore, as the land sinks, rising sea levels will increase the risk of coastal flooding and storm 
surges (IPCC, 2014).  Bangkok is also especially susceptible to flooding during high tides as sea water 
slows drainage as far as 150km upstream (Ziegler et al., 2012).  This effect will reach further inland as 
sea levels rise, increasing the risk of inland floods. 
 
5.2.2 Public and private sector adaptation responses 
 Due to the impact of climate change, adaptation is necessary (IPCC, 2007).  Adaptation is the 
“adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their 
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effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities” (IPCC, 2014, p. 5).  Adaptation can 
be anticipatory (action taken before impacts are felt), autonomous (action taken in response to climatic 
stimuli), or planned (action taken due to deliberate policy decisions) (IPCC, 2007).  In regards to 
adaptation to flood risk, anticipatory and planned adaptations are most common.  
Flood adaptations can further be defined by strategies that protect, accommodate, or retreat 
from flood risk (IPCC, 2000).  Protective strategies seek to defend current natural or built environments 
through hard measures, such as dykes, seawall, floodgates, and watershed transfers (Penning-Rowsell et 
al., 1998; Pilarczyk, 1990), or soft structural measures, such as wetland and mangrove restoration (Tri 
et al., 1998; Boesch et al., 1994).  Strategies to accommodate floods seek to adjust the built 
environment to adapt to a new climate regime, such as through improving drainage, emergency 
planning, or flood insurance (Porio, 2011; Muller, 2007; Cummins & Mahul, 2009; Rosenthal & ‘t 
Hart, 1998).  Retreating from flood risk seeks to remove the risk of flooding completely by moving 
away from the hazard, and can be achieved through resettlement, increasing building setback or zones 
(Porio, 2011; Parnell et al., 2007).   
In Thailand, while all three adaptation approaches are present, protection and accommodate 
adaptations dominate public approaches to flood risk reduction strategies (Poaponsakorn & Meethom, 
2012).  For example, after the 2011 flood the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) began 
raising the level of dykes along the Chao Phraya River and many of its canals, and continues to increase 
its drainage capacity through constructing underground tunnels (Tantikom, 2013).  Retreat has only 
recently begun and is confined to relocating informal settlement from canals (Berquist et al., 2015), 
while more affluent areas continue to expand waterfront developments (Srirojanapinyo, 2009).  
Ultimately, Thailand’s “institutional response has been incomplete leaving significant, reducible, 
vulnerabilities to current and future climate risks unaddressed” (Lebel et al., 2012, p. 56). 
Research on private sector adaptation in Thailand has largely been neglected, with industrial 
estates being a notable exception.  After the 2011 flood, industrial estates in Central Thailand have 
constructed dykes around their properties, improved drainage capacity, elevated essential and expensive 
machinery to higher floors, and/or relocated to other locations within and beyond Thailand (Aon 
Bonfield, 2012). While housing developments generally come after industrial developments, adaptation 
on industrial estates usually only considers their individual properties, rather than including adjacent 
properties that generally house industrial workers.  Housing adaptation is not only vital to individual 
health and prosperity but also the local and national economy (Poaponsakorn & Meethom, 2012). Aon 
Bonfield (2012) found that damages to capital investments and inventory from the 2011 flood only 
accounted for 23% of losses, while business interruption, including lack of employees, account for the 
other 77% of losses.  Research on the private housing sector, however, is limited. 
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Adaptation can be autonomous or planned (Smit et al., 2000).  Within the private sector, 
adaptation has also been further categorized into two groups (Hertin et al., 2003): those that see 
adaptation as a business model, which seeks to maximize profits (Keenan, 2015; Roeth, 2009; 
Warhurst, 2006; Mehndelsohn et al., 1994; Mendelsohn, 2000) and those who reject the model as 
simplistic and see adaptation as part of a larger social and political initiative (Hertin et al., 2003; 
Scheider et al., 2000; Kandlikar & Risbey, 2000) (Figure 2).  Within the private housing sector, Keenan 
(2015) found large firms and those most at risk had the greatest capacity to adapt and, when adaptation 
occurred, it happened autonomously through protective measures (such as flood proofing) and 
accommodation measures (such as improving generator capacity and elevating electrical features).  
Keenan also found that private commercial real estate firms choose to adapt irrespective of public 
policy initiatives and were rather motivated by maximizing profits and minimizing damages.  Whatever 
the motivation is to adapt, a certain level of financial capital is required to turn motivation into action.  
Unfortunately this can lead to private sector adaptation being disproportionally implemented across a 
city. 
 
Figure 2: Private Sector Adaptation Models: Influencing Factors 
 
 Business Model Complex Model 
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who can afford to adapt may develop “spaces of seduction,” which are attractive for development, or 
“fortress spaces,” which protect those within from outside threats (Graham & Marvin, 2001).  Appling 
Graham & Marvin’s (2004) framework to technology and infrastructure to reduce flooding, spaces of 
seduction can have effective networked infrastructure to manage stormwater, whereas fortress spaces 
protect against outside world, including infrastructural limitations it may possess. On the other hand, 
those who cannot adapt are relegated to areas “beyond spaces of secession” and become marginalized, 
ghettoes, and trapped in relative and absolute poverty (Graham & Marvin, 2001).  However, climate 
change adaptation and flood risk reduction strategies of the private housing sector and their 
involvement in splintering urban areas, have not be reviewed by the literature.   
Furthermore, studies on private housing sector adaptation have focused on motivations for 
adaptation, and are largely limited to developed countries (Keenan, 2015; Hertin et al., 2003).  There is 
therefore a need to study private sector adaptation in a developing and rapidly urbanizing context.   
 
5.3  Methods 
In response to the risk of natural disasters and climate change, stakeholders in Thailand have 
initiated a number of adaptation strategies.  Among them is adaptation of housing stock to cope with 
increased risk of flooding.  In this paper we aim to demonstrate that the private housing sector is 
adapting to address the risk of flooding in the Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR).  Key informant 
interviews were conducted in Bangkok, Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani, and Samut Prakan—the four 
provinces of the BMR that surround the Chao Phraya River and house 88% of the region’s population 
(Figure 3).  Respondents were purposefully selected (Creswell, 2014) based on (1) employment in a 
department or agency involved in flood management and/or housing, (2) responsibility in at least one of 
the four provinces, and (3) position of leadership within their organization.   
Through consultation with local academics, document reviews, Internet searches, and snowball 
sampling techniques, we identified over 40 government agencies engaged in housing, flood 
management, and climate change adaptation, as well as six housing organizations.  Of these, 17 
departments and organizations have responsibility to address flooding within the BMR; nine of these 
participated in this study, resulting in 23 interviews conducted between May – August, 2015.10  The 
location of responsibility for all respondents is evenly distributed; with two to four respondents having 
provincial responsibility within each province and 12 respondents with responsibilities across the BMR, 
or the Central Region of Thailand. Eighteen 30-60 minute interviews were conducted face-to-face; five 
                                                             
10 Interviews were conducted with officials from the following agencies: the centralized government departments of the Department of 
Public Works Town and Country Planning (DTP) and the Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM);  the provincial 
departments of the Provincial Administration Organization (PAO), City Planning Department (CPD), Department of Environment (DoE), and 
Bangkok Fire and Rescue Department (BFRD); the municipal department of city planning; and the national housing organizations of the 
National Housing Authority (NHA) and Community Organization Development Institution (CODI). 
47 
 
email interviews were also conducted.  The respondents chose their preferred language for interviews; 
interviews conducted in Thai were subsequently translated into English with the aid of a Thai research 
assistant.  After interviews were conducted, we transcribed and coded data with Nvivo to identify 
common themes. Respondents were sought from the public sector to understand their level of 
awareness of private sector adaptation initiatives.  The thoughts and opinion of private sector 
stakeholders are not represented here and, therefore, we make no claim that the strategies discussed are 
exhaustive, but rather are restricted to public sector respondents who were willing to participate in the 
study. 
Figure 3: Study Area: Bangkok, Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani, and Samut Prakan (Google Maps, 2016) 
 
 
 
5.4 Results 
5.4.1  Private Sector Involvement 
 While literature widely recognizes the private sector as a key stakeholder in climate adaptation 
and disaster risk reduction (Revi et al., 2014; Leck and Simon, 2013; World Bank, 2010a; Dodman et 
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housing sector a key stakeholder in reducing flood risk.  This lack of public sector acknowledgement of 
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in the Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR).   
 Due to seasonal floods, adaptation to flooding is not new (Sthapitanonda & Mertens, 2012).  
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be higher [than] so that their housing areas will not be flooded” (Respondent #22).  Or as another 
respondent mentioned: “The walls around expensive gated communities are already very high, but the 
ones built after the flood are even higher” (Respondent #3).  The extent of adaptation since the 2011 
flood led one respondent to conclude, “Everywhere is raised higher” (Respondent #21).   
Even in areas relatively protected during the flood, adaptations are occurring.  Security walls 
are being repurposed to also guard against floods.  As one respondent mentioned, “We have been doing 
some surveys [since 2011] and we found that the walls are higher.  First of all, you know, industrial 
settings are building higher walls, and of course the land developments, the gated communities, are 
building high walls, thick walls” (Respondent #7).  Therefore, flood protection strategies, while 
traditionally used, have increased in scale. 
 
5.4.2  Protection Adaptation 
 Flood adaptation strategies can be divided into three categories: protect, accommodate, and 
retreat (IPCC, 2007).  Each category was mentioned by respondents: with two protection strategies 
mentioned by 16 respondents, seven accommodation strategies mentioned by 20 respondents, and two 
retreat options mentioned by 11 respondents.  While accommodation strategies in general garnered the 
most attention, the two protection strategies were discussed twice as often as any other strategy.  The 
focus on protection measures mirrors the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) approach of 
hard protective strategies, such as dykes and ditches (BMA et al., 2009).  The construction of walls, 
elevating the ground level, and elevating the first storey were widely recognized among respondents; 
less frequently mentioned strategies are also important options and includes: various architectural 
designs, improved drainage systems, and lot-level stormwater management techniques.   
Protection strategies, such as elevating the land and building walls, were mentioned by 10 and 
13 respondents respectively.  As one respondent stated, “At first [developers] elevated the land to level 
for construction but after the flood they filled up more soil to avoid floods because all areas flooded” 
(respondent #21).  Or as another respondent noted, “All [developers] can do is just raise the land as high 
as possible” (respondent #12).  Raising the land can be expensive, and respondents mentioned walls can 
be a cheaper option, at least initially.  One respondent stated: “It’s cheaper in the first place because you 
don’t have to fill up the land with huge amount of soil.” However, “you have to use more energy for the 
water pumping system to drain water from within the dyke so it seems to be more expensive” 
(respondent #13).   
  While elevating the land is exclusively used in new developments, walls can be added to 
existing developments. For existing buildings one respondent believed walls to be the only option for 
existing housing, “All [developers] can do is to build walls but this will affect [the] drainage system” 
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(respondent #12).  Nevertheless, new developments also use walls to protect against floods.  Walls are 
utilized across the region and many respondents mentioned their dual purpose: “They're scattered all 
over but mainly in the areas that flooded in 2011… In other areas there are also many with the walls, 
[since] they already need [them for] security and also for floods” (respondent #3).  One respondent 
preferred permeable walls (chain link or openings) to allow floodwater to pass through instead of 
blocking floodwater (respondent #22). 
 
5.4.3  Accommodation Strategies 
 Respondents also recognized seven flood accommodation strategies. Elevating the first floor 
was the most mentioned accommodation strategy, with 11 respondents discussing it.  Elevating the first 
floor traditionally includes building on stilts, but has also come to encompass ground floors that are 
designed to be floodable.  As one respondent stated, “we want raised basements, opening the lower 
floor for the flow of the river” (respondent #8).  Operational equipment, such as water tanks, pumps, 
and heater are being moved to higher storeys.  As one respondent explained, “the boiler room will also 
be raised higher so that it can still function when there is a flood” (respondent #13).  To prepare the first 
floor to be flooded, one respondent promoted the use of “materials that are less likely to be damaged by 
water, [such as] not covering the floor with parquet” (respondent #11).  Adaptive techniques, such as 
these, are already widely utilized in rural areas of Thailand where annual floods occur as a matter of 
course (World Bank, 2012).  By building sacrificial first floors, the impact of flooding can be greatly 
reduced.  Kreibich et al., (2005) found that these strategies can reduce damages to household goods by 
48% and to buildings by 53%.  In regards to the 2011 flood in Thailand, where damages to household 
goods and structures were estimated are THB 38 billion and 7.8 billion respectively (USD1.24 billion 
and USD250 million) (World Bank, 2012), the reduction in damages would have been substantial. 
 Floating houses were mentioned by five respondents, but are still in the research and 
development stage within the National Housing Authority and Silpakorn University.  However, when 
students from Silpakorn University presented their project to the public and private stakeholders, the 
response was indifference (respondent #10).  Even between respondents, their practicality was 
questioned: with one respondent waiting to “see whether it’s practical” (respondent #13) and another 
relegating them to “a water park for entertainment” (respondent #12). Nevertheless, the projects are still 
in their infancy, and only time will tell if and how floating houses will be part of Bangkok’s built 
environment. 
  In an attempt to be inclusive in our definition of the housing sector, informal settlements are 
included.  One respondent discussed adaptation within redevelopment strategies of informal 
settlements.  While many public land owners have tolerated informal encroachment of canals in the past 
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(Yap & De Wanderler, 2010), since the 2011 flood Bangkok has increased its resolve to improve urban 
waterways.  In regards to upgrading informal communities along the canals, one respondent 
commented: 
We want them to be able to live with the canal so we make them face the canal, before that 
their backs were turned to it. They will take care of the canal better now that it is the front 
of their house and not the back where they throw rubbish. When it's the front of their house 
it needs to be clean (respondent #4). 
This type of intervention encourages a sense of place or personal ownership in order to maintain a 
healthy canal (Thaitakoo & McGrath, 2008), and therefore reduces the likelihood of a flood.  To adapt 
to flooding, the same respondent mentioned that upgraded houses are built stronger in order to 
withstand potential floodwaters. 
 Some developers of new housing are also improving their properties’ ability to manage 
stormwater on-site, through stormwater retention ponds, water collection, and permeable surfaces.  As 
one respondent explained: 
Many big projects reduce [their] cost[s] by digging up soil from on area and moving it to 
another and it costs nothing. You can see in Sappakorn village that there’s pond looking like a 
natural pond but it’s not. It’s dug (respondent #12). 
Thailand’s Environmental Impact Assessment Act (EIA) requires an assessment for housing projects 
equal to or greater than 500 plots or 16ha, and condominium projects that are equal to or greater than 80 
units or 0.4ha (MNRE, 2010, Article 3, Annex 1.3.28,31).  However, as one respondent noted, 
developers “just always keep [their developments] at 79 units” (respondent #13).  Therefore, one 
respondent summarized: “Housing development smaller than 500 units should also have a pond too” 
(respondent #12).  While respondents recognize that stormwater retention ponds are confined to large 
residential projects, which must conform to the EIA requirements, they also desire that this practice 
become more widespread. 
 The Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA), which governs the provincial city of 
Bangkok, has begun to recognize the advantages of on-site stormwater management. The BMA has 
implemented a strategy to increase water collection and permeable surfaces in order to integrate the 
private sector into its flood management plan by allowing developments to build additional floors if 
either method is utilized (BMA, 2013).  Five respondents noted that both of these strategies are being 
used by the private housing sector. However, the degree of implementation are speculative and range 
from the idea that “there are many projects, It’s very popular” (respondent #3) to “people won’t accept 
that” (respondent #12), since evaluation of these initiatives had yet to occur.   
 In addition to increasing stormwater management at the source, almost a third of the 
respondents mentioned that developers are also improving the ability to drain stormwater.  Kreibich et 
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al. (2005) and King et al. (2015) recognize this trend among households, and therefore it is not 
surprising that developers are including this strategy during construction.   
 
5.4.4  Retreat Adaptation 
 Retreating from flood prone areas is gaining wide support among academics; however in 
practice it can be difficult to implement.  Nevertheless, eleven respondents mentioned that immediately 
after the 2011 flood homebuyers sought to relocate away from flooded areas, choosing to buy primary 
and secondary residences within Bangkok’s protected area, on naturally elevated land, or in 
condominiums to avoid future floods.  Therefore, private sector adaptation strategies are not solely 
based on the reduction of risk or damages, they are also in response to consumer demand.  Of the four 
respondents that reported a rise in condominium development, one respondent explained: 
One of the important reasons why condominiums are booming in the City of Bangkok is 
the great flood of 2011.  People still have a bad image of the big flood, so they had the 
idea, ‘the government has to protect the city of Bangkok, so the center of Bangkok is safe,’ 
so we see many condominiums here (respondent #6). 
Bangkok’s structural flood protection measures also benefit the downstream province of Samut Prakan, 
which was largely spared from flooding in 2011.  Therefore, another respondent mentioned, 
“[Developers] knew that Samut Prakan didn’t flood in 2011; they came here to develop housing 
communities, while people didn’t buy houses in Bangbuathong and Nonthaburi which flooded” 
(respondent #10).  Therefore, consumer demand for housing located in safer locations has led to 
adjustments in private sector actions.  However, this strategy was short-lived, as the previous 
respondent further explained: “Many people wouldn't buy a [house in low areas], especially in 2011 and 
2012, but nowadays people are getting back to [buying] them. Their attention is towards the train lines 
and power plant, so now flooding is overlooked” (respondent #10).   
 
5.4.5  Adaptation Funding 
 Five respondents reported the private housing sector provides resources for public projects. 
They also noted that the private housing sector provided relief aid, volunteers, and equipment during 
past flood events.  While private sector funding, and support, of disaster relief, and private-public 
partnerships, are discussed in disaster risk reduction literature (Carmin et al., 2012; IPCC, 2012; Roeth, 
2009), there is limited information on how companies that are not directly engaged with constructing or 
operating these projects, such as housing developers, could be included.  As one respondent mentioned, 
private firms “just donate when something bad happens” (respondent #1) or as another added, “Only 
during times of emergency, there isn't really a system. Usually the private sector would sponsor the 
food for the volunteers. Then they go on TV to talk about it” (respondent #3).  One respondent 
mentioned a desire to formalise monetary contributions for proactive adaptation by “[setting] up a fund 
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for flood prevention,” with the idea that “if everyone is responsible for the area, flooding will not 
happen. We can use money from the fund to build a bypass to drain water out” (respondent #21).  By 
incorporating the private sector as a source of funding for public flood protection, as well as their 
adaptation strategies to reduce the risk of flooding their own properties, the benefits from private sector 
adaptation can extend beyond a single property (IPCC, 2014; Carmin et al., 2012; United Cities and 
Local Governments, 2011). 
 
5.4.6  Limited Adaptation 
 As mentioned, only a few respondents attributed some responsibility for flood risk reduction to 
the private sector, yet the private sector is adapting.  Perhaps this is due to a general lack of faith in the 
government’s ability to protect the city, as one respondent mentioned: 
If the central government provides alternative measure[s] to prevent the flood efficiently, it 
would be much better. But the government themselves cannot do that so private housing 
sectors have to protect their properties in their own ways; otherwise they will be 
responsible if it’s damaged (Respondent #13). 
While the majority of respondents agreed that the private housing sector is adapting, six respondents 
reported that this is very limited in scope.  Non-traditional approaches to reduce the risk of flooding, 
such as constructing floating houses, improving drainage and stormwater management systems, and 
elevating electrical panels, remain underutilized.  Respondents provided two possible explanations for 
the limited uptake of adaptation strategies since the 2011 flood: the infrequency of extreme weather 
events and a trust in public protection measures.  One respondent noted, “There is not much [that has] 
change[d] because people think that a large flood like the one in 2011 does not happen often” 
(respondent #5). Since extreme events are very infrequent, developers lack the immediate motivation to 
adapt (Hertin et al, 2003).  Or, as another respondent noted, “residents have a strong belief that the local 
administrations have prepared in advance, and the government have allocated budgets for that” 
(Respondent #22).  Nevertheless, the 2011 flood illustrates that large floods are possible, and can cause 
significant damage to the BMR. 
Private sector adaptations have developed regardless of a lack of public sector direction/policy.  
Multiple respondents mentioned that developers adapt out of a desire to do so rather than being required 
or incentivized to do so.  On respondent commented: “If [developers] have the idea that they want 
residents to live safely, then they should choose locations that are safe” (Respondent #8).  Or as another 
stated: “[Developers] should consider their location well before building” (Respondent #10).  
Developers are also left to “[choose] material” that is flood resistant (Respondent #15).  Furthermore, 
departmental websites and publically available documents (in English and Thai) provide very limited, if 
any, guidance for housing adaptations to flood risk.   
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Private sector adaptation to flood risk has increased after the 2011 flood, with numerous 
strategies employed regardless of government direction.  These strategies have implications, not only 
for the adapted property, but that surrounding community as well (Tompkins & Eakin, 2012). 
 
5.4.7 Impact of Private Housing Sector Adaptation 
As the private housing sector adapts to the increasing flood risk, its actions may have negative 
repercussions for the surrounding community.  One respondent summarized the state of the private 
housing sector’s adaptation strategies in Bangkok by stating:  
Each person tries to elevate their own house to fix problems of flooding and lowlands. 
They just care only themselves and how to be better and higher than others. They don’t 
pay attention to the rights and negative effect on others at all (respondent #10). 
Five respondents cited unappealing urban design (e.g. high flood wall barriers) and destroying cultural 
values (e.g. reduced fishing livelihood) as negative impacts.  While urban design is important to cities, 
twice as many respondents recognized that private sector adaptation can increase flood risk within 
networked infrastructures.  For example, if one property is elevated while adjacent properties are not, 
when it rains stormwater will run off the raised property and pool in low-lying properties.  As one 
respondent stated:  
The lower land may face flooding and drainage problems because water from the higher 
area will flow downwards to the lower area and into their house and the owner of the lower 
house has to find their own way to drain water out. (respondent #10) 
In addition to elevated ground, another respondent used Amata Nakorn, an industrial estate in 
Chon Buri, as a recent example of the impact of walls and effective internal pumping capacity, 
“The industrial estate [has] very high walls around them. During the last heavy rain, they pumped 
out the water and flooded the communities nearby” (respondent #3).  The private housing sector, 
therefore, is adapting in a way that serves their interests, with little regard of how their action can 
impact surrounding properties or the community. 
 
5.5 Discussion 
5.5.1  Ad Hoc Adaptation 
 In a rapidly developing city, planning orderly development is a constant struggle (Roy, 2009).  
This is particularly true in Southeast Asia where high proportions of municipal budgets are used to 
maintain the status quo, leaving few resources to monitor, evaluate, or update plans and policies (United 
Cities and Local Governments, 2011), including those to direct private sector flood adaptation 
strategies.  Reducing flood risk must, therefore, compete with other major concerns, such as 
transportation issues and the growing divide between the rich and the poor (see BMA, 2013).  Building 
codes regarding stormwater management in Bangkok, for example, have remained unchanged since 
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they were first implemented in 1979 (Babel & Rivas, 2012).  As such, developments need only to 
connect their drainage systems to the municipal network.  Twenty years ago, NEDECO et al. (1996) 
recommended modifications to the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration Act on Building Control to 
including front yard setbacks and lot coverage to help address stormwater issues; however they have yet 
to be implemented (Babel & Rivas, 2012).  The highly centralized political context can further impede 
appropriate measures to direct adaptation, since changes that may be necessary or beneficial in 
Bangkok may not be relevant in other areas of Thailand.   
The BMA has only recently begun to encourage flood risk reduction schemes, albeit limited to 
new high-rise developments (BMA, 2013).  By providing community benefits a high-density building 
can increase its floor area ratio up to 20 per cent. The BMA has community benefits that are 
incentivized, two of which are flood-related: short-term water retention and increased permeable 
surfaces.  The increased uptake of these strategies can have two positive outcomes to reduce flood risk 
(Chocat et al., 2007; Mitchell et al., 2007).  First, it will reduce the risk of flooding by retained water 
on-site and not allowing it to escape and become floodwater.  Secondly, by retaining stormwater for a 
period of time or allowing it to infiltrate into the ground, the demand on municipal drainage system is 
reduced.  This will lower the immediate demand on drainage infrastructure during a rain event, and 
therefore lower citywide flood risk, as well as lowering infrastructure costs of the city (Chocat et al., 
2007).  However, the limited scope of these incentives curtails their potential benefits. 
Bangkok, and Thailand more generally, has been unwilling and/or unable to direct urban 
growth away from flood prone areas, and at times actively work against creating a more flood-resilient 
environment.  By allowing ad hoc development— and even promoting development in floodplains—the 
government reduces the City’s resilience to flooding.  While Bangkok was once referred to as the 
Venice of the East with its meandering Chao Phraya River and network of canals, most of the canals 
have been paved over with roads (Poaponsakorn & Meethom, 2013; Marome, 2012; Kenworthy, 1995), 
reducing the city’s ability to convey stormwater out of the city.  Centralized policies have encouraged 
development within floodplains, especially within the industrial sector, and overruled local advice when 
it built Suvarnabhumi Airport within a floodway (Lebel et al., 2011).   
With limited oversight or direction, the private housing sector has adapted on an ad hoc basis.  
Respondents commented that limited enforcement, corruption, and nepotism allow the private sector to 
develop with minimal restrictions or repercussions for their actions.  
 
5.5.2  Networked Urban Infrastructures 
The private housing sector’s involvement in reducing the risk of flooding can provide co-
benefits that the public sector may not be able to provide, such as increased investment potential, site-
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specific plans, widespread uptake, and quicker development and implementation of strategies 
(Tompkins & Eakin, 2012).  Private housing adaptation can also act to reduce flood risk to not only 
their property but the surrounding area as well, and reduce the overall infrastructure needs of the city 
(Tompkins & Eakin, 2012).  As a result, changes in housing infrastructure can have a ripple effect on 
other infrastructure systems that are connected to it (such as drainage or transportation) (Omer, 2013). 
The practice of building on higher ground is, in theory, the best option (Hooijer et al., 2004).  
River and coastal flood risk would be virtually eliminated and surface flooding greatly reduced by 
conveying water to waterways.  However, in coastal metropolitan areas, such as the BMR, high ground 
is scarce.  Due to poor land use planning and rapid population and economic growth, development has 
been allowed, and often encouraged to develop on hazardous floodplains (Lebel et al., 2011).  While 
ideas of relocating the capital city to higher ground have been around for decades, the resources to 
implement such an adaptation strategy would be enormous.  Nevertheless, as Bangkok continues to 
sprawl into adjacent provinces, particularly Nonthaburi, Pathum Thani, and Samut Prakan, high ground 
will continue to be sought along the urban fringe.  Urban sprawl across a floodplain may perpetuate the 
negative effects of future flooding, as greater concentrations of people are situated in flood prone areas.  
Therefore, for the BMR, relying on higher ground to build can only be part of the city’s adaptation 
strategy. 
Respondents recognized that the actions taken by the private housing sector can increase the 
risk of flooding to adjacent properties.  The increased flood risk to adjacent areas has two forms.  First, 
respondents commented the elevated lands will increase the rate of runoff to non-elevated lands where 
it will begin to pool if effective drainage is not available.  Secondly, the potential for flooding increases 
as properties improve or construct more efficient drainage systems, which increase the rate of 
stormwater conveyance off of a property.  An increase in efficient conveyance has numerous negative 
environmental impacts, in addition to increased flood risk for areas downstream.  This can be two-fold.  
First, municipal drainage capacity can be exceeded and cause storm drains and canals to overflow.  
Second, private drainage systems may not be fully connected to the municipal system, and instead 
discharge stormwater directly onto adjacent properties or sensitive environmental areas.   
Elevated lands, therefore, can increase the burden of the low-lying residents, who did not have 
the financial resources to elevate their land in the first place and would likely also have limited funds to 
cope with increase runoff.  For example, theoretically if half of the properties are elevated or have 
evasion strategies coupled with an efficient drainage system, then during a localized storm event the 
low-lying properties would experience up to twice as much surface floodwater than otherwise would 
occur if all properties were at the same elevation and drainage capacity.    
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As certain actors in the private housing sector adapt, others cannot.  Graham & Marvin (2001) 
argue the new technologies, such as advance in site-specific flood management strategies, can widen 
the gap between the rich and the poor.  The value of naturally higher lands will likely increase with 
demand and floods continue to plague the region, and therefore could become “spaces of seduction” for 
those who can afford them, while the urban poor and working classes remain on more vulnerable low-
lying land, perpetuating the divide between the rich and the poor in the BMA (Graham and Marvin, 
2001).  Beyond the safety of higher ground, “fortress spaces” (Graham & Marvin, 2001) have 
developed in Bangkok where private properties literally construct walls in case municipal stormwater 
infrastructures fail.   
Inequality in stormwater management that increases the risk of flooding to others can also lead 
to ‘water wars.’  While water wars are generally discussed as a conflict of water scarcity (Chellaney, 
2013), the BMR provides an example of water conflict due to an overabundance of water.  Conflict of 
this nature has already been witnessed in the BMR during the 2011 flood between those who were safe 
behind protective measures and those who were flooded (Poaponsakorn & Meethom, 2012).  On a 
number of occasions, and in various locations across the region, conflict erupted along sandbag walls 
and water gates, as those who were subject to mandatory flooding looked on to those whom the city 
deemed worthy of keeping dry (Poaponsakorn & Meethom, 2012; Fuller, 2011).  As the province-wide 
public system of dykes, canals, and water gates is matched by site-specific private system of protection 
walls and drainage systems, conflict could become more localized, pitting neighbours against 
neighbours.  The 2011 flood, and more recently the localized surface flooding in Bangkok in March and 
June 2015, should be a catalyst for action among officials who continue to believe that residents should 
be content living with floods (Fernquest, 2015). 
 The second way the risk of flooding is increased is through blocking natural water pathways.  
As one respondent noted, “at the moment there are not many [elevated] houses yet [in Pathum Thani], 
so elevation will not be a problem. But if there are many dwellings, the elevation will definitely 
obstruct the flow of water and waterways” and “in populous areas, if everyone put up walls, these walls 
will obstruct the waterways” (respondent #9). Exacerbating this issue, in some instances, is the practice 
of filling in, and constructing over, natural waterways.  The length of the 2011 flood has been, partly, 
blamed on an increase in obstacles that inhibit overland floodwater from reaching the ocean 
(Poaponsakorn & Meethom, 2012).   
 Private sector adaptation can, therefore, be maladaptive and ultimately increase flood risk for 
the city (Kindornay & Twigg, 2015; Barnett & O’Neill, 2009).  This should not be a surprise if profit is 
the key motivator for adaptation in Bangkok, especially in the housing sector where long-term 
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investment in a property is rare among developers.  In order to curb the negative externalities of private 
development, stronger urban planning is needed.   
 
5.5.3  Urbanization and Densification  
 There has been a growing trend in planning, in theory and practice, for densification (Clark, 
2013; Anas, & Hyok-Joo, 2006; Weitz & Moore, 1998; Gail, 1992).  While there are notable benefits 
for limiting urban sprawl through creating denser communities, increased density could prove 
maladaptive for certain urban areas, such as the BMR.  The trend of greater density through increased 
construction of condominiums within Bangkok could lead to an increased risk of flooding.  The threat 
is two-fold.  One respondent worried that a greater concentration of high-rises “might be a worse 
decision” (respondent #6) since it would put more people in the vulnerable floodplain under the illusion 
of full protection.  Therefore, if the protective measures ever fail again there will be even more people 
affected by a flood, needing vastly more resources to cope and respond to the situation, and higher cost 
of damages.  Secondly, as density increases the weight of buildings will increase.  As mentioned above, 
Bangkok currently subsides at a rate of 1cm/year (World Bank, 2010a) and the added weight of more 
condominiums (not to mention fill to elevate properties) will compound this existing problem.  Not only 
will this increase the risk of construction failure as buildings shift on sinking land, but it will also 
increase the risk of coastal flooding and may prolong drainage during storms or a flood (Taramelli et 
al., 2015).  Furthermore, when sea level rise is accounted for the impact of subsidence is multiplied. 
 
5.5.4  A Case for Stronger Planning Institutions 
 Overall, our research illustrates that the private housing sector in the Bangkok Metropolitan 
Region (BMR) is adapting to flooding.  With limited government regulations, programs, or incentives 
the adaptation process in the BMR is largely independent of government direction.  Hertin et al. (2003) 
found incentives to adapt to climate change among home-building companies in the United Kingdom 
were ineffective due to a limited perceived need to adapt at the beginning of the supply chain, which 
only experience minimal impacts of climate change. Furthermore, Keenan (2014) determined that 
among commercial real estate firms in New York City, adaptation to flooding occurred regardless of 
municipal incentives or regulations.  However, in Bangkok the lack of government direction has also 
resulted in negative externalities, or maladaptation, of private sector adaptation, a concept that Hertin et 
al. (2003) and Keenan (2014) largely neglect.  Managing development in rapidly urbanizing cities can 
be extremely difficult and traditional planning approaches—such as building codes, design guides, by-
laws, zoning, urban boundaries, incentives, and educational programs which are widely promoted in the 
literature (Brown et al., 2012; Aerts & Botsen, 2011; Blanco et al., 2009; Kreicbich et al., 2005; 
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Mendelsohn, 2000; Mehndelsohn et al., 1994; Gail, 1992)—must be accompanied by strong institutions 
that are able to enforce legislation, coordinate multiple jurisdictions, and competing interests.  
Respondents highlighted the lack of institutional capacity to enforce current regulations in the 
BMR.  For example, in Nonthaburi, a province with 1.33 million residents in 2010 (NSO, 2010), there 
are only six urban planners, four at the province’s City Planning Department (CPD) to develop plans 
and policies, and one for each of the municipalities of Nonthaburi and Pak Kret to implement provincial 
plans.  Similarly, the centralized Department of Public Works and Town and Country Planning (DPT), 
which has the mandate to advice provincial urban development, has five planners for the BMR.  As a 
point of comparison, the city of St. Catharines in Ontario, Canada, has six planners for a population of 
130,000.  In regards to climate change, Saito (2014) found that it has not been integrated effectively 
into any plans or policies in Bangkok; however, integrating climate change into policies and plans is 
moot if policies and plans cannot be enforced.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 Climate change is predicted to increase extreme weather events, which will result in increased 
risk of flooding in Southeast Asia (IPCC, 2014).  The 2011 flood in Thailand, which has been linked to 
climate change (Hoffmaister et al., 2012), provided an opportunity to investigate the housing sector’s 
adaptation strategies used to reduce the risk of floods.  Through interviews with public officials at 
various agencies engaged in flood management, housing, and/or climate change we determined that the 
private housing sector is adapting primarily through elevating land, building higher walls, and 
increasing a property’s ability to drain stormwater. 
 These actions, if implemented well, can effectively reduce the risk of flooding on private 
property, as well as nearby properties. However, due to rapid urbanization and an inability for the 
government to manage private action, the private housing sector has adapted in an ad hoc manner. As a 
result, its adaptation strategies can have negative impacts on surrounding properties, infrastructures, and 
communities, including an increased risk of flooding and conflict between those who have the capacity 
to adapt and those who do not. 
 More research is required, therefore, to understand the dynamic nature of urban climate change 
adaptation in rapidly globalizing cities, such as Bangkok. If traditional planning practice cannot manage 
private sector adaptation in rapidly developing cities, new and innovative strategies need to be 
developed to effectively manage urban adaptation.  This paper provides a necessary first step to achieve 
this end; however, more research is needed to understand what can trigger sustainable and equitable 
adaptation options within the private sector. 
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Section 6: Thesis Conclusion 
 Climate change is increasing the frequency and severity of natural disasters around the world.  
While both rural and urban area will feel the impact of climate change.  Due to the density of people 
and investment in infrastructure, cities will experience unique challenges to adapt (Revi et al., 2014).  
Unfortunately most municipalities, for one reason or another, struggle to adapt—especially those in 
low- and middle-income countries, such as Thailand.  
In Thailand, climate change has resulted in a shift in precipitation that results in fewer, but 
more intense, rainfall events.  Current flood and drought management systems are not sufficient to cope 
with a new climate regime, and have led, in part, to the national flood in 2011 and localized urban 
flooding in Bangkok in 2015, as well as a national drought in 2015.  This thesis explored the 
ramifications of ineffective public management of water resources, and has argued that this ineffective 
management has led to increased involvement of the private sector in flood management, particularly in 
the private housing sector. The involvement of the private sector has produced mixed results.  I 
interviewed public officials working in flood management, housing, and climate change agencies within 
the Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR) (n=23) and reviewed articles in six newspapers (n=926) to 
understand the current context of flood management and private sector adaptation in Thailand, and the 
BMR specifically.  
 
6.1 Key Findings 
6.1.1 Institutional Traps and Private Sector Engagement in Flood and Drought 
Management 
Cities around the world are struggling to adapt to the impacts of climate change (Revi et al., 
2014).  This is especially true in low and middle income countries, such as Thailand, where public 
institutions are ensnared by traps that hinder effective actions to address flood and drought management 
in a changing climate (Lebel et al., 2011).  Interview respondents and an analysis of newspaper articles 
confirm previous research, which found that government organizations are hindered by issues of 
fragmentation, rigidity, and elite capture (Maier-Knap, 2015; Foran et al., 2012; Reynolds & Team, 
2012; Lebel et al., 2011; Huaisai et al., 2006; Shook, 1997).  Furthermore, this research also confirmed 
and expanded on scale and crisis management traps, which are less prominent in the literature.  
Institutional traps have led to water mismanagement, which is frequently cited in existing literature, as 
well as by interview respondents. Results indicate that the 2015 urban floods and national drought can 
also be attributed to poor flood and drought management by various government agencies, from local 
administrative organizations to centralized ministries.  This has, in part, led to mistrust in the 
government’s ability to manage water, and has inadvertently encouraged other stakeholder involvement 
in flood and drought management—notably the military, royalty, and the private sector.  While, for one 
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reason or another, the military and royalty were frequently praised by the media for their involvement, 
the private sector garnered mixed reviews.   
Newspaper reports on the private sector’s strategies to cope with or prepare for floods and 
droughts highlight positive and negative aspects.  In an attempt to satisfy personal or corporate 
interests, some property owners have acted disreputably in order to obtain a secure water supply during 
droughts or implement flood protection measures, through strategies including exploiting policy loop-
holes and participating in corruption and theft.  However, lack of effective public flood and drought 
management has also stimulated non-governmental organizations, many of which have corporate ties 
such as the Coca-Cola Foundation, to promote sustainable water practices.  Some private housing firms 
are also setting a larger section of land for stormwater management and establishing a fund to be better 
prepared for disaster events. 
Therefore, while institutional traps hinder effective flood and drought management by the 
public sector, they can also stimulate action in non-government agencies and sectors.  However, how 
other actors engage in flood and drought management must to be managed to insure that their actions 
are in the best interest of the wider population. 
 
6.1.2  Private Housing Sector’s Flood Adaptation Strategies 
 Following the first manuscript, which found that the private sector is a key stakeholder in 
climate change adaptation in Thailand, the second manuscript investigated and evaluated the strategies 
the private housing sector currently employs in the Bangkok Metropolitan Region (BMR) to reduce the 
risk of floods.  The private sector is widely recognized as a stakeholder in climate change adaptation, 
but there is limited knowledge about their actions to reduce flooding within the BMR.  Interview 
respondents listed numerous strategies that the private housing sector employs to cope with and adapt to 
flooding within the BMR, including strategies to protect, accommodate, and retreat.  Their adaptive 
strategies can effectively reduce the risk of flooding to their properties; however, the majority of 
respondents are concerned that the private housing sector’s strategies to reduce flooding are ad hoc and 
will negatively impact the city now and in the future.  With limited government oversight, the 
adaptation process is largely uncoordinated and unplanned.   Therefore, stronger urban planning is 
required in order to reduce or mitigate the negative impacts of private sector adaptation, and capitalize 
on its positive outcomes.  As the national economic hub, Bangkok is privileged with a close connection 
to the centralized government, especially with the funds they possess.  However, making the connection 
between federal resources and municipal planning can be complicated.  Nevertheless, in the case of 
Bangkok there is added personal incentive by the governing elite to improve flood and drought 
management within the city and beyond, in order to protect their own houses and communities from the 
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impacts of floods and droughts.  In this regard, elite capture could prove beneficial in provided 
increased support for flood and drought management in Bangkok. However, this should be done with 
regard for areas beyond Bangkok. 
 
6.2  Cyclical Poor Flood and Drought Management and Private Sector Adaptation: 
Future Research 
 When the two manuscripts are reviewed collectively, a feedback loop could exist.  When 
government institutions are trapped and unable to provide effective flood and drought management, 
other stakeholders will act to cope with and adapt to increase risk of water-related disasters. However, 
the private housing sector’s actions may lead to increased water-related disasters themselves, thus 
perpetuating the cycle. While Lebel et al. (2011), as well as this thesis, utilised institutional traps as a 
framework to evaluate flood management, institutional traps can apply to other institutions as well 
(Polterovich, 2007, 2001).  Therefore, more research is needed to determine if planning institutions in 
the Bangkok Metropolitan Region are similarly trapped or if they can effectively manage private sector 
development and help the BMR escape from snare of institutional traps and poor flood and drought 
management. 
 
6.3  The Private Sector’s Voice 
 This research interviewed public officials on their perception of impacts of private sector 
adaptations and, with support from newspapers, presented a rationale for private sector involvement.  
While the public sector is a necessary actor and regulatory body, the private sector must also be 
engaged directly.  Specifically, there is a need to understand how the private sector views their own 
actions, and the actions of other private sector actors, as well as what motivates them to adapt.  Such 
research would inform public institutions on how the private sector could be motivated to adapt in way 
that is beneficial to the community beyond a landowner’s property line.   
 
6.4 Looking Beyond Bangkok 
 This research is relevant to cities and regions beyond Bangkok and Southeast Asia.  With an 
estimated 200 million people at risk of annual flooding around the world (UNDP, 2004), and another 
100 million are projected to be at risk if no action is taken to adapt to climate change (IPCC, 2007), 
flooding is a common natural hazard that numerous nations and cities must address.  With the impacts 
of climate change, annual flood risk will increase and shift geographic locations based on a new 
precipitation regime.  Extreme weather events are also projected to increase around the world (IPCC, 
2007).  Many low and middle income countries suffer from some or all of the institutional traps that 
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Lebel et al. (2011) identified, therefore this thesis presents a possible outcome of those traps in other 
locations with similarly weak public institutions. 
 Cities in high income countries may also find this research relevant.   Primarily, it provides a 
foundation to maintain strong institutions and public sector involvement in private sector affairs.  In a 
time where national level governments are downloading more responsibility to lower level governments 
(United Cities and Local Governments, 2011), especially when climate change adaptation is involved 
(Kehew et al., 2012; Tavares & Santos, 2013; Lesnikowski et al., 2011), mechanisms must be in place 
to ensure that lower level governments remain strong and capable to fulfill their new responsibilities.   
 This thesis has provided a basis to understand the private sector’s involvement in flood 
management.  It is hoped that this research will inform practice and contribute to stronger planning 
institutions to encourage positive private sector adaptation to water-related risks, while discouraging 
maladaptive practices. 
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Appendix 1: Email Recruitment 
Email Subject Line: Interview: Private sector involvement in flood risk reduction 
Dear _______________: 
My name is Karmen Whitbread and I am a Masters student from the University of Waterloo, Canada in 
the School of Planning.  I am working locally with the support of Professor Wijitbusaba Marome at the 
Thammasat University who, I believe, has recently contacted you in regards to my Master’s research 
project.  I am inviting you to be involved in my research project by participating in an interview that 
will take about 45-60min.   
To follow up with Prof. Marome’s contact I would like to request your participation in the project I am 
conducting as part of my Master's. The devastating flood of 2011 highlights the need to adapt to flood 
risk.  While the public sector has a major role in protecting its citizens from flood hazards, the private 
sector has been increasingly recognized as having a large potential to self-adapt.  As climate change 
threatens increase the severity of floods, a better understanding of the role that the private sector can 
take in reducing flood risk is necessary, not only to save lives and a livelihoods, but also to maintain the 
local and national economy.  Therefore, this study seeks to understand the role that the private housing 
sector can take to reduce flood risk and how the city can support such efforts.  
It is my hope to connect with people who are engaged in the [housing/flood management] to invite 
them to participate in this research project. I believe that you have a unique understanding and 
experiences relating to the risk of flooding in Bangkok. Participation in this study would entail an 
interview, during which we would discuss the role of the private housing sector in reducing flood risk 
and how city planning and policies can support private sector flood adaptation.  Interviews will take 
about 45-60min; however the amount of time can be adjusted to meet your availability.  Participation in 
this study is completely voluntary.  
All information you provide through your participation in this study will be kept confidential.  Neither 
your choice to participate nor the content of the interview will be shared with your employer.  You will 
not be identified in any report or publication based on this research.  Furthermore, I do not anticipate 
any risks in participating in this research.  If you’d permit the use of audio recording, the recording will 
be destroyed immediately after the interview has been transcribed.  All other data will be kept in a 
secure location for 6 years and then destroyed.   
If you have any questions regarding this study, or would like additional information, please contact me 
at 095-510-7983 or email at kwhitbread@uwaterloo.ca.  You may also contact my supervisor, Carrie 
Mitchell, at 0011-519-888-4567 ext. 33027 or by email carrie.mitchell@uwaterloo.ca.  If you would 
prefer, collect calls will be accepted and, if necessary, a translator will be employed. 
I would like to assure you that this study has been reviewed and received ethics approval by a 
University of Waterloo Research Ethics Committee. However, the final decision about participation is 
yours. If you have any comments or concerns with this study, please feel free to contact Dr. Maureen 
Nummelin, the Director, Office of Research Ethics, at 0011-519-888-4567, Ext. 36005 or 
maureen.nummelin@uwaterloo.ca.  
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I hope that the results of my study will be beneficial to your [organization/department] and to the City 
of Bangkok, as well as other municipalities and urban planning, disaster risk reduction, and climate 
change researchers and private sector developers. I very much look forward to speaking with you and 
thank you in advance for your assistance with this project.  
Yours sincerely, 
 
Karmen Whitbread 
Master’s Candidate, School of Planning 
University of Waterloo, Canada 
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Appendix 2: Project Information and Verbal Consent Script 
 
Hello, 
My name is Karmen Whitbread and I am a Masters student at the University of Waterloo, 
Canada. Thank you for taking the time to meet with me today. This interview is for my research on the 
role of the private housing sector in reducing flood risk and how municipal policies can support it.  This 
study is funded through the Coastal Cities at Risk (CCaR) project and is supported locally by Professor 
Wijitbusaba (Ann) Marome at the Thammasat University. 
This study will address how the private housing sector responses to the risk of flooding globally 
and specifically within Bangkok.  It also seeks to understand how municipal policies can aid in the 
private sectors in this matter.   Participants from various housing associations and city departments 
which engage in flood management have been selected to be interviewed.  Participation in this study is 
voluntary and you may withdrawal at any point.  The interview will take 45-60 minutes to complete and 
may decline to respond to any question.   
All information you provide while participating in this study will be kept confidential.  Neither 
your choice to participate nor the content of the interview will be shared with your employer.  You will 
not be identified in any report or publication based on this research.  I do not anticipate any risk to you 
for your participation in the study.  To ensure an accurate recording of your responses, the interview 
may be audio recorded.  All recordings will be destroyed after transcription, and all other data will be 
kept five years after the completion of my Master’s degree, which is anticipated to occur during the 
summer of 2016, or 2559 in the Thai calendar.  Excerpts from this interview may be included in my 
thesis and/or publications that come from this research; however any use of quotations will be 
anonymous 
I would like to inform you that this study has been approved by a University of Waterloo 
Research Ethics Committee. Nevertheless, the decision to participate is yours. If you have any 
comments or concerns with this study, please feel free to contact Dr. Maureen Nummelin, the Director, 
Office of Research Ethics, at 0011-519-888-4567, Ext. 36005 or maureen.nummelin@uwaterloo.ca.  If 
you would prefer, collect calls will be accepted and, if necessary, a translator will be employed. 
If you have any questions or comments about this study after our meeting today, here is my business 
card with my contact information on it.
11
 
 Do you have any questions? 
 Do you agree, of your own free will, to participate in this study? 
 Do you agree to have the interview audio recorded? 
 Do you agree to the use of anonymous quotations in any thesis or publication that comes from 
this research? 
Thank you for your cooperation in this study.  
                                                             
11 My business card will contain my email, phone number in Thailand and Canada, and the University of 
Waterloo’s mailing address.  It will be double sided with English on one side and Thai on the other.   
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Appendix 3: Interview Questions 
 
Interviewer: ___________________________ Date: __________________________________ 
 
Translator: ____________________________ Time: _________________________________ 
 
Participant: ___________________________ Position: _______________________________ 
 
Agency: ______________________________ Gender: _______________________________ 
 
Introductory Questions 
1. What are your responsibilities within the organization? 
2. How many people work for the organization? 
a. How many fall under your direction? 
 
General Flood Questions 
3. Can you describe the current state of residential flooding in the Bangkok Metropolitan Region? 
a. What kind of flood occurs where? 
4. Can you describe who is currently responsible to reduce the risk of residential flooding? 
a. Whose responsibility do you think it should be? 
b. Do you feel the private sector is responsible to provide flood protection? 
5. What does your organization do to reduce the risk of flooding in residential areas within BMR 
and how do you to it? 
6. How do you currently provide information about flood risk to private housing stakeholders? 
 
Window of Opportunity 
7. In your opinion, what was the cause(s) of the 2011 flood? 
8. How has the housing sector responded to the flood of 2011, both formally and informally? 
9. How have these changes been evaluated? 
10. What is your view towards climate change and the risk of flooding? 
 
Adaptation 
11. How can new private sector housing be constructed to reduce the risk of flooding? 
12. How can the existing housing stock be adapted to reduce the risk of flooding? 
13. What are the impact of private housing sectors adaptation to flooding? 
a. How can private housing sector adaptation influence, either positively or negatively, 
the risk of flooding to nearby areas? 
14. Do residential properties work with neighbouring properties to reduce the risk of flooding? If 
so, how? 
 
Policies 
15. Does Thailand or the City of Bangkok/BMR have any policies, by-laws, or guidelines for best 
practice regarding private housing sector flood protection? If so, what ones?   
a. If so, do you think they are effective?  How could they be improved? 
b. If not, do you think there should be?  How could they help your association? 
c. Do you have a copy that I could have? 
16. What new policies could be implemented to promote reducing the risk of flooding by the 
private housing sectors? 
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a. How can positive new or existing housing developments be encouraged to positively 
adapt to reduce the risk of flooding? 
b. How can negative adaptations be discouraged? 
 
Normative View 
17. Ideally, what role should the private housing sector take to protect against flooding? 
a. What can the City of Bangkok/Nonthaburi do to support this role? 
18. What is are the barriers/challenges for the private sector to provide flood protection in the 
housing sector? 
 
Site Visits 
19. Are there any specific sites that you think demonstrate either good or poor private housing 
sector adaptation? 
 
Snowball 
20. Do you know of anyone else who may be interested in participating in this study and share their 
knowledge on this topic? 
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Appendix 4: Newspapers Review Procedure 
 
Newspapers Information 
1. Record newspaper, date, and weekday/weekend/holiday 
2. Record total number of pages (including classifieds, comics, etc.) 
3. Record number of pages in general news, business, and opinion sections, as well as any other 
relevant sections. 
 
Obtain Relevant Articles 
4. Read headlines 
a. Look for articles about natural disasters, housing, or climate change 
i. Article about non-flood related canals were ignored (eg. the Kra Canal in 
Thailand  that would facilitate a shorter shipping route, similar to the Suez 
Canal in Egypt) 
b. If an article is ambiguous, skim/review article until its relevancy can be determined 
5. Retain the article, with date and page number identified on the newspaper clipping 
 
Review & Code 
6. Record article codes 
7. Record key information/quotes 
8. Add any relevant comments 
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Appendix 5: Confidentiality Statements  
Confidentiality Statements were signed by research assistants that had access to confidential 
information, such as respondents’ identity, position, and audio recording.  The four Canadian research 
assistants assisted with the newspaper review and analysis, which are publicly accessible; therefore 
confidential forms were not required.  Below are the required signed Confidential Statements. 
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Appendix 6: Key Newspaper Review Results 
Key Quantitative Data from Newspapers 
“WRA” 
Water-Related Articles 
(with articles about Thailand, 
elsewhere, or everywhere) 
Newspaper 
Total Bangkok 
Post 
The 
Nation 
Post 
Today 
Thai 
Rath 
Kom 
Chad 
Luek 
Matichon 
Newspaper Characteristics: 
  Language English English Thai Thai Thai Thai 
 
  Geographic Scope Bangkok National Bangkok National National National 
 
No. of Natural Disaster Articles: 
  All Disasters 219 174 111 65 70 84 726 
  WRA*-Thailand 106 92 92 49 53 61 453 
  WRA-Anywhere 153 120 96 50 58 64 541 
Summary: Water-related articles comprise of 74.5% of all disaster reports, and of those approximate 4 out of 5 
articles are about events within Thailand. 
 
Relative importance of WRA-Thailand reporting 
  Days that WRA-Thailand  
  made the front page 
14 19 21 28 32 26 150 
     Percent of days 18% 24% 34% 45% 52% 42% - 
Summary: WRA-Thailand make the front page approximately twice as often in newspapers in Thai than in 
English.  Additionally, 67% of natural disaster reports occur within a week of a rapid on-set event. 
 
No. of WRA that specifically mentions to flood and drought mismanagement: 
  WRA-Thailand 20 14 34 
  WRA- Outside Thailand 0 0 0 
Summary: Floods and droughts are reported to be mismanaged within Thailand while flood and drought 
management beyond Thailand are either reported uncritically or positively. 
 
No. of WRA-Thailand that mention various disaster stages: 
  Cause 64 38 11 14 7 4 138 
  Impact 80 60 55 28 25 29 277 
  Response 72 63 34 19 23 29 240 
  Recovery 16 15 - - - - - 
  Prepare for another  
  disaster 
22 17 4 0 1 2 46 
Summary: Reports focus on impacts and responses, with only 10% of articles mentioning recovery or adaptive 
measure to prepare for another water-related event. 
 
No. of WRA-Thailand that mention public and non-public actors in flood and drought management 
  Public Agencies 76 64 - - - - 140 
     No. of agencies   
     mentioned 
33 34 - - - - 41 
  Military 11 5 - - - - 16 
  Royalty 6 2 - - - - 8 
  Private Sector 21 26 - - - - 47 
Summary: WRA-Thailand focuses on the actions of 41 public agencies, which appear in 70% of all WRA-
Thailand.  The private sector also makes a notable appearance in 24% of WRA-Thailand.  Additionally, 
when multiple actors are mentioned within the same article, they are largely discussed independently of 
each other. 
 
No. of reports on climate change that mention: 
  Mitigation 6 19 3 3 0 1 32 
  Adaptation 6 7 1 0 0 0 14 
Summary: Adaptation is highlighted half as often as mitigation 
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Key Themes Regarding Institutional Traps in Thai Newspapers 
 Sources 
Institutional Traps 
Fragmentation 
Media report on the actions of government agency independent from each 
other, even when cited within a single article 
Patsara, 2015; Saritdet, 2015; The 
Nation, 2015c 
Rigidity 
A rigid view of agency roles leads to mistrust between agencies Patsara, 2015 
Flood management strategies focus on structural measures The Nation, 2015e 
Non-structural approaches are criticized for being ineffective to address 
flood and drought issues, while structure measures are presented 
positively 
Bangkok Post, 201k; Tanatpong, 
2015; The Nation, 2015d; 
Wasaman, 2015 
There is lack of trust between agencies Patsara, 2015 
Elite Capture 
Urban centres (i.e. Bangkok) are prioritized over rural areas Apinya & Manop, 2015; Bangkok 
Post, 2015d, 2015g; Sasithorn, 
2015b; Supoj, 2015a 
Urban poor are unsubstantially blamed for flooding in Bangkok Holloway, 2015 
Scale 
A highly hierarchical government structure limits local governments 
ability to adapt 
Supoj, 2015a 
Crisis Management 
There is limited planning for floods and droughts Achakulwisut, 2015a; The Nation, 
2015f 
The BMA maintains their drainage system as a react to floods rather in 
preparation for the annual rainy season 
Natthapat, 2015 
Strategies to reduce the impact of the 2015 drought were developed during 
the event with minimal pre-planned drought measures (such as water 
conservation schemes) 
Achakulwisut, 2015b; Bangkok 
Post, 2015m; Sasithorn, 2015b; 
The Nation, 2015d, 2015f 
 
Impacts of Institutional Traps 
Flood and Drought Mismanagement  
  Flood and drought mismanagement include: 
 developing on floodplains; 
 neglecting forecasts;  
 mismanaging dam and water supply; and, 
 exploiting groundwater extraction 
Achakuwisut, 2015; Bangkok 
Post, 201e; Osathanon, 2015; 
Witpatayotin, 2015; Wancharoen 
& Jikkham, 2015; 
Yongcharoenchai, 2015 
Lack of Trust in Government Strategies 
Manufactures have lost faith in the government’s water management plans Apisitniran, 2015; Erich, 2015 
Broadening of Flood and Drought Governance 
The military has become involved with localized floods The Nation, 2015b; Wancharoen 
& Jikkham, 2015 
The military was a key actor in the 2015 drought Bangkok Post, 2015f, 2015j 
Private sector actions are largely represented negatively  Bangkok Post, 2015l ; 
Katharangsiporn, 2015; 
Prateepchaikul & Attakor, 2015; 
Shepherd, 2015 
The private housing sector disregards flood risk Srimalee, 2015 
The private sector can produce positive community outcomes by engaging 
in flood and drought management 
Pimsa-noh, 2015; Srimalee, 2015; 
The Nation, 2015a 
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Appendix 7: List of Respondents  
1. Chief Official. A Bangkok Metropolitan department. Bangkok. Interviewed in English on August 
7, 2015  
2. Division Manager. A national housing association. Bangkok. Interviewed in English on July 15, 
2015. 
3. Senior Official. A Bangkok Metropolitan Administration department. Bangkok. Interviewed on 
July 23, 2015. 
4. Director. A Bangkok Metropolitan Administration department.  Bangkok. Interviewed in Thai on 
July 14, 2015 
5. Senior Analyst. A national agency. Email interview in Thai on July 14, 2015. 
6. Director. A Bangkok Metropolitan Administration department.  Bangkok. Interviewed in  English 
on July 10, 2015 
7. Senior Official. A national agency. Central Thailand and Bangkok Metropolitan Region. 
Interviewed in English on July 8, 2015. 
8. Senior official. A Bangkok Metropolitan Administration department.  Bangkok. Interviewed in 
Thai on July 10, 2015 
9. Senior official. A Bangkok Metropolitan Administration department.  Bangkok. Interviewed in 
Thai on July 10, 2015 
10. Senior Planner. A Bangkok Metropolitan Region Planning Department. Interview in Thai on July 
8, 2015. 
11. Division Director. A national housing association. Central Thailand. Interviewed in English on 
July 7, 2015. 
12. Division Director. A national housing association. Central Thailand. Interviewed in Thai on July 7, 
2015. 
13. Division Director. A national housing association. Central Thailand. Interviewed in Thai on July 7, 
2015. 
14. Division Director. A national housing association. Central Thailand. Interviewed in Thai on July 7, 
2015. 
15. Senior Official. A national housing association. Bangkok. Email interview in Thai on July 23, 
2015. 
16. Senior Official. A national housing association. Bangkok. Email interview in Thai on July 23, 
2015. 
17. Senior Official. A national housing association. Bangkok. Email interview in Thai on July 23, 
2015. 
18. Senior Official. A national housing association. Bangkok. Email interview in Thai on July 23, 
2015. 
19. Municipal Planner. A Bangkok Metropolitan Region municipality. Interviewed on July 24, 2015. 
20. Senior Planner. A Bangkok Metropolitan Region Planning Department. Interview in Thai on July 
24, 2015. 
21. Senior Official. A Bangkok Metropolitan Region Department of Environment. Interviewed in Thai 
on July 24, 2015. 
22. Chief Executive. A Bangkok Metropolitan Region Provincial Administration Organization. 
Interviewed in Thai on July 23, 2015. 
23. Senior Planner. A Bangkok Metropolitan Region Planning Department. Interviewed in Thai on 
July 3, 2015. 
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Appendix 8: Fieldwork Pictures 
 
Figure I: A Type Bangkok Canal. 
 
Figure II: Larger Canal. Smaller canals, such as figure I, lead to larger waterways. 
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Figure III: Encroachment of Waterways.  Many canals and rivers are encroached on by formal and 
informal settlements. The community depicted here were severely affected by the 2011 flood, since the 
sandbag wall to protect Nonthaburi was constructed further inland from the Chao Phraya River. 
 
Figure IV: Encroachment of Canals.  While newspaper articles blame Bangkok flooding on informal 
settlements that have developed along and over the majority of canals in Bangkok, respondents (#4 & 
#7) commented that the actual impact of these developments are unknown. 
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Figure V: Challenges of Canal Maintenance.  This canal was cleaned approximately twice a month 
while I conducted fieldwork research, each time removing large quantities of garbage. 
  
Figure VI: Weekly Garbage Pickup.  Over 20 large baskets of garbage were collected weekly from 
approximately 1ha of four-storey residential buildings. 
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Figure VII: Development Over Canals.  On the right of the chain-link fence with a green railing is a 
canal, which flows beneath a platform that residents use for various purposes. 
 
Figure VIII: Industrial Sector Adaptation to Flooding.  This industrial estate has built an 
approximately 2.0m earthen berm topped with an approximately 1.0m concrete wall.  The estate also 
improved its pumping capacity.  The 2011 flood line is visible approximately 2.5m up the power pole. 
92 
 
 
Figure IX: Splintering Adaptation.  While the industrial estate from Figure II has reduced the risk of 
floods to their property, those beyond the wall remain at risk, and possible at greater risk that before the 
wall was constructed. 
 
Figure X: Fortress Place.  This residential community in Nonthaburi has constructed a wall to protect 
against both intruders and floods. 
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Figure XI: Monsoon Rains Roll In.  Frequent short-duration, localized storms bring large volumes of 
precipitation areas of Bangkok which overwhelms the areas capacity to convey stormwater and leads to 
flooding typically between one to four hours. 
